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A Discussion of Karl Jaspers' Conception of Reason

A Thesis

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by

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Abstract

- I. My attempt in this paper is to consider how the traditional view of reason as a faculty comes to be replaced by Jaspers' view of reason as a "praxis". It means a change of metaphysical outlook and procedure.
- II. The ground for such a change had been prepared by Dilthey's "critique of the historical reason" and also by Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's restoration of the awareness of the Ground of Being.
- III. The view of reason as a faculty is described from its rise to its collapse. In Socrates-Plato's thought, the faculty-view and praxis-view cannot be clearly divided without difficulty.

Aristotle is the founder of the faculty-view. This Aristotlean determination of the view of reason seems characterized by the abstraction, or rather by an idealization of the Greek ground-experience of the surpassing Being which still orientated Socrates-Plato's thought.

Aquinas strengthens this view. Kant reaches the highest formulation of this view. Hegel develops this formulation, and at the same time brings about its collapse.

- IV. Jaspers returns to the encountering relation of man with the Ultimate Being, and reaches a view of reason as praxis. In opposition to the view of reason as a faculty, Jaspers is best understood as one who restored reason to the meaning-context which was still present in the faculty-view under sublimation into idea.

Jaspers, having recourse both to historicist and existential awareness, chooses "Love" as the "unconditional imperative". And the

unconditional imperative is regarded as the "voice" of the Eternal in Time, that is, the Timeless in Time. Thus Jaspers drives his reflection to the point where reason and Love are united in confrontation with the Ground of Being. Then he concentrates this awareness as his own "ground-experience", and regards this as the guiding star for his philosophizing.

Therefore, for Jaspers, reason must not separate itself from the polaric unity with Love which is simultaneously eternal and historical. Man's state of the awareness and choice of this fundamental relationship is called "Existenz".

But Existenz in its historical manifestation in Time is also "potential Existenz" in the sense that it is committed to the task of recovering itself from its constant tendency to split into what Jaspers calls "empirical existence", "the understanding" and "Geist" (as the whole of feeling, willing and knowing).

On this basis, reason is seen as what restores the splintered Existenz to the unity of authentic Existenz. But this is not a task which the individual as a potential Existenz can do by himself alone. It is done only in relation with other individuals.

Reason as a personal concern for one's own movement towards authenticity is called "transcending", and as the ground of relationship to others it is called "communication".

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The purpose and perspective of the present work

The aim of the present work is to discuss the significance of Karl Jaspers' conception of reason. Jaspers' thought is generally treated under the label of 'existentialism'. Like all other cases of applying 'ism' in defining a trend of thought, the term 'existentialism' too seems not free from ambiguity. Therefore, we must start with a provisional consideration of some perspectives in our discussion.

(a) On predispositions to existentialism

Jaspers is one of those distinguished philosophers who struggles to clarify and establish reason. His thought as a whole is so distinctive that to regard it simply as for or against existentialism does not seem to represent a fair treatment of the nature of his conception of reason. The difficulty of confusing Jaspers' thought with 'existentialism' is also indicated by the fact that Jaspers himself regards certain tendencies of the so-called existential movement as "a possible debasement of the elucidation of Existenz".⁽¹⁾ And it must be noted that such criticism rests in fact upon the significance of his conception of reason.

Brand Blanshard regards existentialism as a revolt against reason and carries on his historical review of the ideas of reason without showing any interest in Jaspers. And this is probably because Blanshard

1. Jaspers: Philosophie, II, p. XXIII.

holds "Existentialism is deeply sceptical of reason".⁽¹⁾ John Macquarrie mentions the decisiveness of the conception of reason in Jaspers, saying:

"Like Kierkegaard, he recognizes the polarities, tensions, and discontinuities of experience, so that philosophy is to be understood as a continuing actity, and can never arrive at some final all-embracing system; on the other hand, Jaspers stresses the importance of reason, but a reason which takes account of the irrational factors in experience and does not try to explain them away in any one-sided manner."⁽²⁾

But Macquarrie's exposition of the "philosophical faith" in Jaspers is carried on without relating it in any way to Jaspers' conception of reason. As we see in these representative examples, what Jaspers really means by reason tends to be overlooked, and consequently the significance of Jaspers' achievement on the question of reason is likely to be left unexamined.

(b) Jaspers conceives reason in terms of metaphysics.

First, we must distinguish the object of our study from its ambiguity because of the application of the label of 'existentialism' to it. As we have mentioned, Jaspers' thought is in general regarded as one of the pre-eminent achievements of existentialism. And this will not be wholly unreasonable, for it is true that Jaspers' thought as a whole would be inconceivable if his strong consciousness of Existenz were to be omitted. However, if the word 'existentialism' is used to characterize anything as

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1. Brand Blanshard: Reason and Analysis, George Allen and Unwin, 1962, p. 34.
 2. John Macquarrie: Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, SCM Press, 1963, p. 356.

a "reaction against rationalism"⁽¹⁾ or as a "manner that reduces philosophy to a purely personal affair"⁽²⁾, then the word does not seem to cover the essential in Jaspers' thought. The conception of reason which we are considering in Jaspers is not that which is subjected to any unexamined irrationalism nor to any subjectivism which rejects the dependence upon the historical development of philosophy.

Jaspers employs the word "Existenzphilosophie" first in his book entitled Man in the Modern Age (Geistige situation der Zeit), and contrary to Jaspers' own intention, this word is likely to be taken as equivalent to the word 'existentialism'.⁽³⁾ Jaspers adopts this word to indicate the nature of a movement of philosophy in confrontation with such formal disciplines as sociology, psychology and anthropology. What he actually wants to do is not to deny the validity of these forms of human consciousness but to be with them and advance beyond them. Let Jaspers speak about the structural position of this term in its relevance to the total direction of his philosophizing:

"Existenzphilosophy is the way of thought by means of which man seeks to become himself; it makes use of expert knowledge while at the same time going beyond it.

"This way of thought does not cognise objects, but elucidates and makes actual the being of the thinker.

"Brought into a state of suspense by having transcended the cognitions of the world (as the adoption of philosophical attitude towards the world that fixate being), it appeals to its own freedom (as the elucidation of existence) and gains space for its

1. See Paul Roubiczek: Existentialism for and against, Cambridge (Eng.) University Press, 1964.

2. Mortimer J. Adler: The Condition of Philosophy, Atheneum, N.Y., 1965, p. 69.

3. See Walter Kaufmann: Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, Meridian Books, The World Publishing Co., 1956, p. 22.

own unconditioned activity through conjuring up Transcendence (as metaphysics)."(1)

Apparently the bracketed parts correspond to the title of each volume of his formative work Philosophie: i.e., Philosophical World-Orientation, The Elucidation of Existenz, and Metaphysics. Therefore Jaspers' usage of the word 'Existenzphilosophy' does not permit us to identify it with a certain predisposition towards existentialism. Jaspers rejects such a possibility, on the ground that his elucidation of Existenz does not mean to cognise Existenz but to make an appeal to its potentialities, whereas as 'existentialism' it pretends to be discourse about a known object.(2)

Jean-Paul Sartre defines existentialism, saying: "Existentialism is a doctrine that renders human life possible; a doctrine, also, which affirms that every truth and every action imply both an environment and a human subjectivity".(3) Whereas Sartre holds existentialism to be a doctrine or an exclusive and final truth, Jaspers by the "elucidation of Existenz" advances towards the limits of Existenz and embraces it with the consciousness of ignorance in terms of infinitude. Jaspers regards the thought of 'mere' Existenz as isolated from the totality of being. Thus he calls the thought of 'mere' Existenz 'existentialism'; and likewise, he applies the term 'rationalism' to the 'mere' understanding (Verstand), 'naturalism' to the 'mere' empirical being (Dasein), 'idealism' to the

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1. Man in the Modern Age, tr. by Eaden & Cedar Paul, Anchor Book, Doubleday & Co., Inc., N.Y., p. 175.
 2. Reason and Existenz (Vernunft and Existenz), 1935, tr. by William Earle, The Noonday Press Inc., N.Y., p. 72ff.
 3. Existentialism is a Humanism, in Kaufmann's cit., p. 288.

'mere' spirit (Geist), 'positivism' to the 'mere' world-being (Weltsein), and 'acosmism' to the 'mere' Transcendent.⁽¹⁾

It is rather impressive in this respect that Jaspers, referring to the Japanese translation of his three volume Philosophy, says:

"As for my book, the volume three (Metaphysics) is the most important, and the rest comes in the order of the volume two (Elucidation of Existenz) and the volume one (World-orientation)."⁽²⁾

Thus by culminating in metaphysics, Jaspers aims to participate in the "philosophia perennis", that is, the one eternal philosophy, which he interprets as "praxis" for man to become an authentic being.⁽³⁾ Maurice Friedman would define existentialism not as a philosophy but as "mood", "tendency" or "direction" of movement towards particulars, and he sets up the concept of "the worlds of existentialism" and points out that this mood does not become an espousal of particulars at the sacrifice of all generality and abstraction.⁽⁴⁾ But as far as Jaspers is concerned, such a view will not hold true, because for Jaspers, reason, as he understands it, is crucial for the status of metaphysics but not so for the prosecution of such a negative "generality and abstraction".

1. Jaspers: Von der Wahrheit, Piper & Co., Verlag, Muenchen, 1947, 2 Aufl., 1958, s. 165.

2. Existentialism (Japanese Journal), ed. by The Existentialist Association, Tokyo, 1962, No. 27, p. 94.

3. See Jaspers: Way to Wisdom (Einfuehrung in die Philosophie, 1949), tr. by R. Manheim, Yale University Press, p. 15f.

4. See his The Worlds of Existentialism, Random House, N.Y., 1964, p. 4ff.

CHAPTER II

The metaphysical characteristics of Jaspers' view of reason

In this chapter, we shall consider the metaphysical characteristics of Jaspers' view of reason. And the consideration shall be restricted to the passage from Wilhelm Dilthey to Jaspers.

- (a) Jaspers' view of reason is characterized as an attempt to overcome the historicist view of reason put forward by Dilthey.

Whether metaphysics is possible or not, it seems that no thought has ever succeeded in diminishing the possibility of metaphysics unless it has been inspired by another form of metaphysics. Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example, who is one of the most influential thinkers in analytic philosophy, impressively confesses his early reverence of the world which is beyond the boundaries of language. Although, on the ground of his epistemological belief in the scientific language, he holds that a metaphysical desire does not add to our knowledge, its actuality he sees in man, saying:

"But it (metaphysical desire) is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it."⁽¹⁾

Modern man is accustomed to apply natural-scientific principles to the comprehending of man. And belief in the identity of a logical system and the reality of the universe finds its main achievement in

1. The Philosophical Review, Jan. 1965; A Lecture on Ethics prepared between Sept. 1929 and Dec. 1930, p. 12.

Hegel. Along with these directions, the sovereignty of human studies or socio-historical sciences prepares for the days when all empiricist and rationalist principles can be reduced to man's life or experience in the process of time. This is a thought-revolution brought forth by nineteenth-century historicism. The movement is, on one hand, a "methodic" change, and on the other, an expression of man's self-consciousness in the time contemporary to him. The totality of this spiritual context was examined by Dilthey.

Jaspers regards Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as the determinants of the contemporary philosophical situation.⁽¹⁾ Jaspers carries out his philosophizing by interpreting these two epoch-makers. That he emphasizes reason is originated in his awareness that their thought of Existenz ends in the "tragic-knowledge". Jaspers thinks that their thought failed in communication. He sees in their conception of Existenz the lack of the "polaric awareness" of the historicity of man. The thought of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche too could not be properly understood without seeing it as established on the ruined field of the historicization of man. The change in ontology brought about by these thinkers is deeply related to the conviction of the part played by man's subjectivity in the shaping of history. Moreover Jaspers' thought as a polarity context of reason and Existenz is an ontological rather than a psychological matter. But what distinguishes Jaspers' metaphysics from the conventional one is based upon his consciousness of man's historicity. In view of this, we think it is acceptable to

1. See Jaspers: Reason and Existenz, p. 23ff.

characterize Jaspers' thought by focusing on the transition from Dilthey, through Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to Jaspers.

- (b) The sovereignty of spirit (Geist) is what is sought through Dilthey's task of a critique of the historical reason.

H.A. Hodges points out the transition from Dilthey to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Jaspers. He interprets this as a transition from the conflict in Dilthey, between his historicism and his awareness of the choice in life, to existential choice, and thus he sees the transition as the emergence of existential choice.⁽¹⁾ But in consideration of the conception of reason in Jaspers, the transition is rather from historicization (Dilthey) to eternalization (Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), and the polarization (Jaspers) of man.

Dilthey sets himself the task of a "Critique of the historical reason", which is originally established by Dilthey himself as a concept of the mental totality of human studies (Geisteswissenschaften) in contrast to the context of natural sciences. By human studies, Dilthey not only understands historical knowledge but also sets up this concept in order to establish the context of sciences which was accomplished chiefly by the Historical School in the nineteenth century. Dilthey considers this as a new context of sciences on the ground that, though human studies vary in aim and method, these are united in their subject matter, i.e., thoughts and activities of man. Thus Dilthey seeks for the epistemological foundation for such a complex of human studies. His intention is to clarify the

1. See his Wilhelm Dilthey--An Introduction, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1944, p. 105ff.

autonomy of human studies and eventually to emphasize the significance of grasping the individual or the particular in human history.

As far as Dilthey's method is concerned, he refutes all the metaphysical possibilities of giving ground for such a world of mind. He reduces to 'man' cognition and metaphysical principles such as external world, time, substance, causality, and so on. And then he considers man as an inseparable unity of intelligibility, will and feeling. However, there is a fundamental basis that supports his methodological peculiarity: that is, his will to be authentic. Let us inquire into how this will-to-be-authentic in Dilthey is maintained throughout the methodological structure of human studies, which he establishes.

Dilthey is concerned with the epistemological and logical foundation of human studies, but his goal is the autonomy of the mind. He reduces the autonomy of the mind to "inward-experience" (das Erlebnis) or "life" and "comprehending" (Verstehung), out of which, he holds, all the concepts, all the general judgments and all the general theories are derived.⁽¹⁾ For Dilthey, inward-experience is what cannot be exhaustibly objectified. It is the fact of self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein) which cannot be ascribed to any prior origin within man's spiritual life. However, Dilthey regards this world of the self-consciousness not merely as a theoretical principle but also as a living, historically understood incarnation; that is, the incarnation of the poetic and philosophical movement in Germany from Lessing to Schleiermacher and Hegel.⁽²⁾ Dilthey takes this generation as that in which the dominant poetic impulse for self-

1. See his *Gesammelte Schriften* Bd. 1, s. 117.

2. See his *G.S.* Bd. V, s. 12ff.

creation (Gestaltung) and self-expressing lives throughout in interaction with the scientific and philosophic movements. It is a generation of the impulse to enjoy and comprehend all manifestations of human life.⁽¹⁾

Dilthey says, "Such a golden age of the spiritual life calls into being, in historical thinkers, a great strength and variety of inward-experience."⁽²⁾

Therefore, for Dilthey, his theoretical achievement as far as human studies are concerned is the immediate reflection of what and how he lives. Here lies the depth of Dilthey's conception of "self-consciousness". And here lies the ground for his practical seriousness in respect to his methodic approach. For Dilthey, to examine human studies as the development of such self-consciousness implies in the last resort to grasp what he is. In other words, by confirming the conception of self-consciousness which he regards as prior to any investigation of the origin of the mind, he comes to reach the certainty of a sovereignty of Will, or a responsibility of action.

Thus Dilthey comes to comprehend all human activities in relevance to thought manifested in the historical understanding. He says, "Man finds himself in this nature (sovereignty of will) as 'imperium in imperio'."⁽³⁾

(c) Metaphysical characteristics of such a unification of human studies and life.

Holding the autonomy revealed through a unique generation, and having examined a thorough study in history and psychology, he comes to refute not only the applicability of natural-scientific principles to human studies,

1. Ibid., and see G.S. Bd. VII, s. 88-117.

2. Cit., s. 95.

3. G.S. Bd. I, s. 6.

but also he excludes all the metaphysical possibilities of projecting any logical identification of this independent realm of cognition. Dilthey denies the possibility of metaphysics as science (Wissenschaft) whether empirist or idealist. He holds that the "supernatural", with which all systems of metaphysics are concerned, should be sought in the inward-experience of man.⁽¹⁾

For Dilthey, without the independence or sovereignty of man's subjectivity, there is no science. The ultimate aim of his scientific approach is to liberate human studies and thus to establish the superiority of the mind. And the space for the freedom of the mind is the developing world of history. That is to say, a man shapes (Bildet) himself by comprehending history, and achieves himself by expressing and creating out of his inner world. This he calls the "objectification of the inward-experience".⁽²⁾

We are reminded of Schleiermacher's thought as developed in the Monologen, which can be linked with Lessing's desire for personal perfection which he deals with in his The Education of the Human Race. Both thinkers contend that to comprehend history and to express oneself within the field of history or human community are the ways to perfect oneself in terms of eternity. We can interpret the transition from Schleiermacher to Dilthey in terms of Schleiermacher's boundless desire to comprehend all one finds in Dilthey of epistemological examination and confirmation. As Schleiermacher says:

1. See G.S. Bd. I, s. 390ff.

2. See G.S. Bd. VII, s. 145ff.

"Truly I demand aloud, Time may come and bring me as much as possible material in variety for the purpose of action that is the shaping (Bildung) and expressing my nature. I fear nothing. To me, order and all the external conditions are equally valuable.

"Those which are brought forth out of man's communal actions have to pass by towards me, downpour on me and inspire me in order to be inspired again by me.

"And in accordance with the way I receive and manage them, I will find my freedom, and then shape and express my peculiarity".⁽¹⁾

This attitude to life is that which Dilthey deals with as "objective idealism" in his Weltanschauungslehre. Dilthey takes it as in the living context of the mystery experience. It is finally regarded as the way to all phenomena in the universe from within. Understood from within, phenomena consist in a structure which reflects man's own inner structure. Therefore, metaphysically seen, such an attitude must be regarded as the mood that marks the presence of Deity in every historical reality or in every phenomenon.⁽²⁾

(d) On the significance of Dilthey's conception of the historical reason.

Such a view of metaphysical totality, which is bound up essentially with Time or History, doubtlessly leads to relativism, and this Dilthey himself is fully aware of. By founding the general principles of science upon the structure of the concept: metaphysical Life, and by reducing such metaphysical principles as 'substance', 'time', 'causality' to natural science, Dilthey firmly holds that metaphysics is impossible in

1. Monologen, Kritische Ausgabe von F.M. Schiele, 2 Aufl. s. 70 (Original, s. 106).

2. See G.S. Bd. VIII, s. 117f.

any sense. There is no a priori transcendental truth prior to the living structure of life. The structure of life consists of such equally valid moments as "objectifying", "evaluating", "ordering", "intending or purposing". In other words, life is a unity of all these unique elements which correspond to such human faculties as intelligence, feeling and will. The development of man's history is what is woven out of the interaction of these elements of the unity of life. The decisiveness of such dynamicity of spirit as history, therefore, depends on what to emphasize, whether it is intelligence, feeling or will. Dilthey holds, it is in the last resort an action that is provoked by the imperative to solve the "riddle of the world".⁽¹⁾

Now corresponding to each of these elements (intelligence, feeling and will), this decision of emphasis brings forth three main types of thought or attitude to the world: philosophical, religious and poetic thoughts. And on the same ground, philosophical thought is divided into three types of outlook: "naturalism", "idealism of freedom" and "objective idealism". Seen from such an aspect of historicity, truth reached by a man is in relativity. However, this is not the end of Dilthey's thought. Dilthey says:

"The last word of the mind that has journeyed through all of the world-views is not the relativity of them, but on the contrary, the sovereignty of the mind abiding over each of those world-views, and at the same time the assertive awareness that, with the various modes of the mental attitude, one reality of the world is given to us."⁽²⁾

1. See G.S. Bd. VIII, s. 80f.

2. See G.S. Bd. V, s. 406.

For Dilthey, thought is impossible without a unity of "recognition of actuality", "evaluation", "signification" and "intention". All these consist in the structural unity of Life or inward-experience. There is no going behind this structural totality. It is also the foundation for such metaphysical categories as "being", "cause", "value" and "purpose" etc., so that neither of them can be regarded as prior to the rest, because there is no cause, value, purpose nor norm which can be considered to be unconditional.⁽¹⁾

In such contexture (Zusammenhang), philosophical thought is that which plays the function of "a particular" that seeks for the "universally valid knowledge" of the world of "inward-experience". The necessity of the universally valid knowledge too must be reduced to the structure of the mind, a structure which is primarily "teleological". Namely, seen from its objectifying performance, it is bound up with a teleological structure which seeks an increasingly clearer representation of the objective. Seen from its performance of evaluating, it is bound up with a reflection of what is really valuable. And again considered from its performance of purposing, a man seeks the last and highest form of universally valid knowledge in order to guide his life in relation to things, men and community. And further, socially and historically considered, those who are engaged in universally valid knowledge come to belong to one teleological structure. Thus, in the last resort, this whole structure of universally valid knowledge finds itself related to or conditioned by poetic and religious approaches to the "riddle of the world" and Life.⁽²⁾

1. See G.S. Bd. V, s. 404f.

2. See G.S. Bd. V, s. 372-375.

In brief, Dilthey's conception of the historical reason comes to manifest itself as a whole whose boundary merges into the universe of mystery. Dilthey's thought is not merely relativistic but polaric, too, because for Dilthey, there is no pure reason which is independent of the structure of Life, and also because there is no possibility of life's becoming history (self-shaping and self-expressing) without comprehending what is externalized out of another form of the structure of life (human studies or comprehending history). Nevertheless, this polarity of the "historical reason" is what should be characterized as contemplation (theōria), insofar as the relation of Life to mystery is concerned. Dilthey holds that the "divine contexture" (goettliche Zusammenhang) as the whole or the "divine ground" (goettliches Grund) is what is experienced as "frame of mind" (Gemütsverfassung) through "contemplation" of the given phenomena.⁽¹⁾ He says:

"Metaphysics isolates only a single side from the liveliness of subject, from the life-contexture of person, and then projects it as world-contexture (Weltzusammenhang) in the world of immensity." (2)

To conclude, Dilthey's task of a "critique of the historical reason" finds that the will-to-be-authentic is fulfilled when a man becomes a history-creating subject. And as for the Ground, it is left to the contemplative grasping of mood (Gemuet).

(e) Consciousness of crisis and awareness of the ground of Being.

In the following, we are considering how the will-to-be-authentic, dominant in Dilthey, comes to be put into a new form of the awareness of the

1. See G.S. Bd. VII, s. 81, 115ff.

2. Cit. s. 117.

Ground. (Let us employ a term "ground-experience" (Grunderfahrung) in representing man's awareness of the whole of "beings".) The purpose of this consideration is to point out that the characteristics of Jaspers' view of reason are deeply related to the new ground-experience of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.⁽¹⁾

Dilthey sought to preserve the sovereignty of man's subjectivity. And that sovereignty was formed in the subject's comprehending and creating of history. In other words, to become authentic implies to become the subject of history. Thus history becomes the ground, and the awareness of the Ground is reduced to the mood of such a historical subject. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, contrary to Dilthey, start with an awareness of the encounter between an individual person as subjectivity and the eternal which is the "ground of Being".⁽²⁾ For these thinkers, man's relation to history is what should abide in their own age. They do not praise it like Dilthey. They accuse their traditions of being productions of a certain blindness to the individual's immediate relation to the Ground. Though they are different from each other in how they characterize the Ground (that is, for Kierkegaard it is a personal God whereas for Nietzsche it is a sort of pantheistic Life or Earth (Erde)) they are one in absolutizing the individual's subjectivity in relation to the eternal. Therefore their consciousness of history is characterized as a consciousness of crisis.

However, their consciousness of crisis must be distinguished from

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1. See Jaspers; Reason and Existenz, 1st and 5th Lectures.
 2. See Paul Tillich; Systematic Theology, Vol. I, University of Chicago Press, 1951, and also his Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, the same publisher, 1964, p. 18ff.

the social-scientific one such as Karl Marx begins with. Marx, according to his writings in Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher (1844), expresses his awareness of the alienation of man in society. Marx's consciousness is fundamentally bound up with the metaphysical mood of his time. He carries out his contemplation in a form which is in contrast to the tradition of German idealism up to Hegel. Describing his essentially dogmatic switchover from his idealist days, he says:

"The curtain has fallen. My holiest has been torn off. And new Gods came to be brought in. Idealism, which I have cherished in my bosom by comparing it with that in Kant and Fichte, now I have come to leave it behind and seek for Idea within the reality. If it had been that gods lived in heaven apart from the earth, now it were that gods have become the centre of the earth."(1)

In such a maxim-like metaphysical mood, Marx grasps man and the civil society as the world of alienation.

His consciousness of this alienation is based upon his awareness of the relation between the state and man. The former is divided into the completed political state and the civil society, and corresponding to such a division, the latter is divided into the generic life and the material life, or the communal being (*Gemeinwesen*) and the really existing individual (*wirkliches Individuum*). The political community is that in which man is valid to himself as the communal being, whereas the civil society is that in which man plays an active part as a private man and regards others as the means, and lets himself fall as low as the means and

1. From Marx's Letter to his Father, Nov. 10, 1837.

so comes to be at the mercy of the power of others. Marx holds that in civil society man is an untrue appearance both to himself and others. And he holds that the true man, who is the man of the political state, is to be realized only when he becomes the generic being and then recognizes, organizes as social power his authentic power. That is to say, the emancipation becomes achieved only when his social power is not separated from himself because he also has political power.⁽¹⁾

Marx's consciousness of crisis as expressed in his doctrines of alienation rests upon his reaction to Hegel's metaphysics; and this reaction is justified by such generalized causes as the political state, the civil society, the generic man or the individual. The question of man is determined in Marx by his choice of a certain concept of reality (Wirklichkeit) which is restricted within his own comprehension of Hegel or within his own fundamental dependence upon the power of logic, the sort of power he had seen illustrated in Hegel. Thought is confined to an already-constructed metaphysical or sociological general concept. Their ignorance or unawareness of the limits of the general concept weakens or misleads the thought of both.

The consciousness of crisis in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche comes from a different ground. They think out of their awareness of the "eternity" in which they see their own ground of being, and in which they see the historical, whether civilization, metaphysics or science, as under question as to its meaning. Their consciousness is that which springs from the encounter of the total personality. And whether theistic

1. See Marx's Zur Judenfrage in Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher, 1844.

or antheistic, so to speak, this encounter is for them what surpasses the temporal order. The consciousness is the thought which expresses the nature of the time seen in the light of such an encounter. Kierkegaard, for example, ascribes his whole authorship-activity to his God-relation:

"and now that I am to talk about my God-relationship, about what every day is repeated in my prayer of thanksgiving for the indescribable things He has done for me, so infinitely much more than I could have expected, about the experience which has taught me to be amazed, amazed at God, at His love and at what a man's impotence is capable of with His aid, about what has taught me to long for eternity and not to fear that I might find it tiresome, since it is exactly the situation I need so as to have nothing else to do but to give thanks."⁽¹⁾

But Kierkegaard does not mean that he takes his thought as a sort of revelation. He is well aware that it is in itself dialectical.⁽²⁾ It is, for him, a "reflection-relationship".⁽³⁾ It is what awakens his poetic impatience:

"And if that poetic impatience awakes in me again for an instant, it seems as though I heard a voice speaking to me as a teacher speaks to a boy when he says: Now hold the pen right, and form each letter with equal precision. And then I can do it, then I dare not do otherwise, then I write every word, every line, almost without knowing what the next word or the next line is to be."⁽⁴⁾

Thus their thought is brought forth out of their state of existence.

1. Kierkegaard; The Point of View for my Works as an Author, tr. by Benjamin Nelson, Harper & Brothers, New York, p. 66.

2. See cit. p. 83.

3. See cit. p. 69.

4. Cit. p. 67f.

Therefore, the thought is bound to be "lonely" and no general concept is capable of exhausting it. Dilthey, interpreting the loneliness of a thinker who transcends all historical conditions, says that man is liberated from the bondage of the given and the determined when he turns to contemplate upon himself or upon the totality of things.⁽¹⁾ But for these thinkers, thought is not this sort of contemplation, and yet it is in loneliness. Their thought is what they are forced to express by their inwardness. They cannot but speak because they see the meaning of the generation and at the same time because they see the fallenness of the same generation in which they live. Since they live out the encounter with their generation as individuals, they speak to the individual, but this does not mean that the crisis is a matter merely for the individual. The consciousness of sovereignty of free subjectivity as seen in Dilthey is now replaced by the consciousness of forfeiture of the eternal in man.

In Kierkegaard, the crisis is the forfeiture of living personal relationship to a personal God. In Nietzsche, it is the forfeiture of the primitive, preconceptual, power relationship to the world in its pantheistic totality. Considered logically, both of them are against the attempt of the logical or categorical systematization of man: Kierkegaard finds his target in Hegel, and Nietzsche in Christendom. Considered substantially, they are against replacing a concrete relationship to the eternal by a relationship to tradition and history. And the latter relationship, if it claims to rule the former, they take as deception. They are aware of this deception dominating their generation. A concrete

1. See his G.S. V., s. 377.

relationship to the "eternal" gives man authentic being, and the other relationship leads him to forfeit his being. Their existential psychology has its root in such a consciousness of crisis.

We have seen that thought had come to be aware of its own subjectivity as in the context of an eternal. In Dilthey we tried to see the structure of a typical historicization of man, and in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche we simply noticed that such historicization was radically questioned and that thought came to spring directly out of man's relation to the eternal.

CHAPTER III

The Historical Position of Jaspers' View of Reason

I. Its distinction from Husserl's phenomenological view of reason.

In the previous chapter we have tried to discuss the historical background of Jaspers' thought as a whole. In this attempt we have been led to the point where the "will-to-being" which dominated Dilthey's thinking was bound to collapse, because the thought is now moved by a consciousness of crisis. Neither the conviction of "progress" nor the confidence of historicist "development" holds true any longer. Both the achievement of history and of the ideas supported by that achievement come to be examined in the light of an awareness of the Ground of Being.

Thus all universal principles have now to share their lot with historicism, and come to be seen no longer as prior to the individual's relation to the Ground of Being. The individual finds himself encountering Being and comes to be aware of his relationship to it. A man is now metaphysically called "Existenz" in the sense that he as an individual must act singlemindedly in order to be an independent encounterer of Being. This awareness goes beyond the consciousness of history.

But the destruction of the historicist view does not necessarily mean its vanishing away. For in turn, the above awareness comes to be bound up with the generalized truths of the historicist view. The coexistence as well as the succession of ideas find a re-ordered significance within this awareness. Science, too, will have its proper place in

it. And the relationship between the sciences and certain philosophies finds a new significance in the awareness. Indeed, every mode of thought will have a new significance in the light of this fundamental awareness.

This movement of thought could be called another revolution of thought in the Western world. In the following we are engaged in placing Jaspers' conception of reason within its historical setting by restricting our concern to the relation between the awareness of the Ground of Being and the corresponding consciousness of reason. A terminological use of the term 'reason' is not the issue here. A great system of thought always seems to be deeply related to a certain ground-experience of Being, the ultimate, the absolute, the surpassing or the encompassing. And the thinker may take it to be a personal God, a pantheistic spirit, a principle, the totality of the world or the universe, matter, an idea, and so on. And the attitude of the thinker to such a ground-experience may remain either devoted or indifferent or sceptic. And further the "devoted" attitude may be either one of faith or one which aims at clarification. And at last the clarification may be bound up with the total concern of the thinker or with a desire to establish fresh intellectual principles.

If this is the case, the most general feature of the conception of reason must rest upon whether reason is examined from the point of man's way to the ground awareness or merely as the third term between the thinker and the ground awareness, and the latter also could be regarded as a particular of the former. For this reason we are examining Jaspers' conception of reason in relation to some typical thoughts in which reason is conceived as the most decisive part of man's way to the ground-experience.

Seen from the relation to the ground-experience, the conception of reason shows its historical development from the view of reason as a faculty to the view of reason as praxis. We may formulate the transition from the faculty-view to the praxis-view as follows:

(1) The faculty-view shows its rise in the transition from Plato to Aristotle.

(2) And in Thomas Aquinas this view gains a universal evaluation.

(3) In Kant it reaches the first accomplishment of its own formulation.

(4) And later in Hegel, the view reaches its culmination in the view of the free subject of history.

(5) Next in Dilthey the view starts a new course which denies the possibility of an eternal, pure form and leads to the function of the universally valid knowledge implanted in the temporal development and the structure of inward-experience (das Erlebnis). And thus the faculty-view finds reason composited in the will-to-be.

(6) In Husserl the view becomes an attempt to restore its desire for absolute validity by transcending the natural approach to the ground of knowledge, i.e., an a priori structure of the "transcendental subjectivity".

This Husserlian restoration of the faculty view is that which succeeds Aquinas' acceptance of Aristotle, and succeeds also in the objectivization of reason held from Kant to Hegel. Despite Husserl's scientific attempt at a contemporary analysis of man's mental life, he remains in the old tradition, which restricted the question of reason to the realm of the "methodological object".

This confinement within a scientific-methodological structure is dominant even in Heidegger, who respects the limits of the natural reason which Husserl subjected to the principle of "Epoche".

Heidegger, it must be pointed out, is primarily concerned with the restoration of the pre-Socratic concept of Being, i.e., the totality of all beings whether things or ideas. Heidegger, by "destroying" the whole tradition of ontology since Plato and, by positing Nietzsche to be the fulfilment of metaphysics, separates himself from that stream of thought dominant from Aristotle to Hegel.

Nevertheless insofar as his ontology rests upon his application of the Husserlian Idee of phenomenology to his reduction of man to "Time" that he holds as if it were 'emanatio' out of Being, Heidegger remains in the Thomist tradition that seeks to determine Being in an absolute and conclusive term. That is to say, regardless of his transcending the Aristotelian and Hegelian tradition of the conception of ontology and accordingly of reason, and again, regardless of his magnificent reduction of Logos to Being-as-totality, he remains in the tradition of the "objectivization" of reason.

Now, Jaspers owes his psychological studies to Husserl's

phenomenological insights, but his thought grounds itself not in any methodology but in the "obedience to it (the demand) that produces the true being".⁽¹⁾

Jaspers is distinguished from the Husserl-Heidegger line by a clear understanding of the radical difference between a true science and philosophy.⁽²⁾ Jaspers' conception of reason finds its position by overcoming the limits of the attempt to objectify reason. And this attempt was carried out in the radical stage of self-reflection in Husserlian Phenomenology. Jaspers' overcoming is accomplished not by rejecting the possibility of the scientific reason but by accepting and transcending it towards the agential, encountering relation of man as a whole to Being, which Jaspers regards as "the transcendent". In this sense, reason comes to be conceived as praxis within which all the faculty-conceptions gain meaningfulness.

II. On the faculty-view.

(a) A rise in the transition from Socrates-Plato to Aristotle.

So far no attempt at distinguishing between the thought of Socrates and Plato seems to have been successful, we can do no other but put them in what might be called a Socrates-Plato contexture of thought.

John Burnet explains Socrates' and Plato's thought in terms of a rationalist interpretation. He emphasizes the significance of their

1. Jaspers: Ueber meine Philosophie, (in Rechenschaft und Ausblick), s. 425.

2. On Jaspers' basic attitude to the Husserlian Idee of Phenomenology, see cit. s. 386f.

doctrines by enumerating them. And he points out the change in Plato's mind on the ground that the doctrine of "forms" was avoided in the Theaetetus and came to be criticized in the Parmenides.⁽¹⁾ Similarly, Burnet was convinced of the shift from the period of dependence on Eukleidean doctrine to that of an inclination toward Parmenidean: here Burnet supports his argument by pointing out the gradual fading out of Socrates as a mouthpiece in such dialogues as the Parmenides, the Sophist, the Statesman, the Philebus, the Timaeus, the Cratylus and the Laws--in which he does not appear at all.⁽²⁾

In accord with the same critical view-point, Burnet ascribes the myth in the dialogues to the Orphicist influence to Socrates' imagination,⁽³⁾ and takes them as linked with the allegorical expression, and he goes on to say:

"The 'supercelestial region' is clearly identified with that of pure thought, and the forms the mind beholds in it--Righteousness itself, soberness itself, Knowing itself--do not lend themselves in any way to crude pictorial fancies."⁽⁴⁾

And further Burnet, resting upon the modern distinction between 'feeling' and 'reason' continues to say:

"There is no suggestion of a different way of knowing to which we may have recourse when reason and intelligence fail us. To put the matter in another way, allegory and myth are not employed to

1. See his Greek Philosophy, Macmillan & Co., 1914, p. 235, 253.

2. See cit. p. 236f.

3. See cit. p. 131.

4. Cit. p. 167.

express something above reason, but to adumbrate what is below reason, so far as that can be done. It has its place half-way up the scale and not the top; for it is only the poverty Love inherits from his mother that gives rise to these passionate yearnings. When they are satisfied, there is no more room for striving and longing. And I suspect that all true mysticism is of this nature, and that to set feeling above reason as a means of knowing is only a perversion of it. However that may be, I am firmly convinced that the mystical side of the doctrine of forms is due to Socrates and not to Plato."⁽¹⁾ (Underlined by the present author.)

In this view, Burnet remains consistent by employing the term of "the enigmatic manner"⁽²⁾ to interpret Plato's constant concern for the world of the surpassing.

He points out Plato's concern for such a world never ceases even in the Timaeus and the Laws. Facing these difficulties, Burnet has recourse to the superiority of the Platonic Good to the Platonic idea of God as soul.⁽³⁾ But we must point out that this does not explain the combination of the Good and the Sun referred to in the Republic, where, though the idea of the Good is not considered as God or being, the radical separation of the Good from possible science and truth must be reduced to something surpassingly different from the development of Plato's doctrine, and we quote:

"Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is, as I would have you say, the Idea of good, and this Idea, which is the cause of science and truth, you are to conceive as being apprehended by knowledge, and yet, fair as

1. Cit. p. 167f.

2. Cit. p. 337.

3. Ibid.

both truth and knowledge are, you will be right to esteem it as different from these and even fairer..... What a wonder of beauty that must be, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty..... In like manner you must say that the good not only infuses the power of being known into all things known, but also bestows upon them their being and existence, and yet the good is not existence, but lies far beyond it in dignity and power."⁽¹⁾
(Underlined by the present author.)

The significance of Socrates-Plato's thought lies not in its doctrinal achievement but in its fundamental structure which rests upon the ground-experience of the surpassing. This fundamental framework is the basis for philosophizing. It is also the basis for Socrates-Plato's confidence in starting from, and recurring to, praxis throughout the whole philosophizing. If there is a development from the strictly Socratic to the Parmenidean Plato, it should be signified in the last resort as the striving of thought animated by the consciousness of its own relationship to the surpassing. And thought which considers philosophy as the preparation for death⁽²⁾ maintains its structure even through the Parmenidean dialogues.

The Theaetetus which is widely regarded as the turning-point towards the Parmenidean dialogues deals with the theme of epistemology in the modern sense. And the conclusion of the dialogue is also widely regarded as a negation both of sensationalism and of intellectualism. If the dialogue were a merely epistemological discussion, such a view might hold good, but in fact the dialogue is concluded with the following words

1. The Republic, tr. by B. Jowett, 508d-509b.

2. See The Phaedo, 80d-81a, 84ab, 107d, 114c, etc.

of Socrates:

"But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge whether of difference or of anything else! And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion?But if, Theaetetus, you will be all the better for the present investigation, and if not, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, and will be too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art; I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great and famous men know or have known in this or former ages."(1)

The point of this passage is not to belittle the value of epistemological discussion but to return to the stillness of the awareness of the surpassing which is the ground not only for science and knowledge but also for philosophy of knowledge. And this attitude to the surpassing remains, unaltered as, for example, in this tribute to Parmenides:

"My reason is that I have a kind of reverence; not so much for Melissus and the others, who say that 'All is one and at rest', as for the great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric language he may be called;--him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. And I am afraid that we may not understand his words, and may be still farther from understanding his meaning."(2)

Heidegger, too, like Burnet, tends to confine Socrates-Plato thought to the realm of doctrine, and ascribes the discussion of Being to

1. Cit. 210a-d.

2. Cit. 183e-184a.

the pre-Socratic only. But the essential of Socrates-Plato's thought cannot be exhaustively found in this nor that doctrine, nor even in the doctrine of the Idea of the Good. It lies in a contexture of thought, the ground of which Plato considers as beyond objectifiability. He says in his Seventh Letter: "Concerning the essential I have written no book nor shall I write one."⁽¹⁾ It is the truth distinct from truths. It is what forces Plato to confirm doctrinal achievements in the poetic which is finally expressed in the following passage from the Seventh Letter:

"With it, it is not the same as with other things we learn: it cannot be framed in words, but from protracted concentration devoted to the object and from spending one's life with it, a light suddenly bursts forth in the soul as though kindled by a flying spark, and then it feeds on itself."⁽²⁾

The awareness of the relation between the surpassing and man is the constant theme of philosophising in Socrates-Plato. The Socratic consciousness of "ignorance" is not a mere hypothetical presupposition for the formulation of thought. It is the reflection of the awareness of the field, so to speak, surrounding the whole performance of thought in Socrates-Plato. The significance of "soberness" is, too, not a merely ethical or communal one. Fundamentally, it is rooted in the awareness of this field of thinking.

This orientation of philosophising towards the Ground determines the nature of reflection about reason. Philosophising is regarded as the becoming of the soul:

1. Quoted from Jaspers' The Great Philosophers, tr. by R. Manheim; Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., New York, p. 131.

2. Ibid.

"But when returning into herself (soul) she reflects, then she passes into the other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her wandering, and being in contact with things unchanging is unchanging in relation to them. And this state of the soul is called wisdom?"⁽¹⁾

Hence the reflection on reason (nous) is basically concerned with the task of the soul's becoming. It can be formulated 'to know is to become', so the ultimate nature of knowing is philosophising, and in consequence knowing finds its meaning in philosophising. In short, reason is the practical way of "becoming".

Now all other forms of knowing are handled by examining and re-ordering them in terms of their relevance to the soul's becoming authentic. And the doctrine of forms has its place within this final ordering. Reason seeks the eternal bond of beings. Out of the variations of knowing, reason is seen to be the unchanging aspect of the soul, as we see in the *Phaedo*:

"Then reflect, Cebes: of all which has been said is not this the conclusion?--that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and rational, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and that the body is the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and irrational, and multiform and dissoluble, and changeable."⁽²⁾

A much more articulated statement of reason peering towards the highest world, i.e. the Good, is given in the *Republic*. A radical line is drawn

1. *The Phaedo*, 79d.

2. *The Phaedo*, 80ab.

between changing phenomena and true being, and correspondingly between the soul's attention⁽¹⁾ to the former and to the latter.

And the crucial point must be that the Idea of the Good is regarded as being the cause of knowledge. That is to say, reason is regarded as a power "which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower", that is, the Idea of the Good. Insofar as its relationship to Being is concerned, reason is regarded as a "power" of the soul, and there is no such power unless it is imparted along with the power of the Good which is the surpassing. Any faculty which aims at the "changeable" is regarded as belonging to an order different from the order of reason. We shall not discuss whether there is here a so-called dualistic contradiction between good and evil. What we are concerned with is that reason is considered here only as what is defined in its relation to the surpassing.

And the dynamic relation between "dialectic" and the surpassing only puts reason in comparison with the "fixed bases" of "hypotheses" to which the mere "applied thinking" or the understanding (Verstand) has recourse. It is well admitted that, as far as reason (noesis, nous) is considered as a part of "the division of a line", it is determined to be an object of comparison. It is thereby linked with other powers of the soul. And not only reason but also even the Good is thereby made an object when the thought determines itself to the business of comparison.

In the Republic, for the purpose of comparison, the Good is brought into the world of object, and the world is divided into the

1. See the I.A. Richards' translation 'The Republic of Plato', W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., the author's comment on 508d.

intelligible and the visible world. And the former is further divided into the world of the Good and the world of ideas or things themselves. And the latter is divided into the world of appearance and the world of resemblance. And to each of these worlds, reason (noesis), understanding (episteme), belief (pistis) and picturing or imagining (eikasis) are applied in that order.

And each relation between the world of object and the power of the soul is examined in terms of degrees of clarity. The degrees ascend from the lowest to the highest, i.e. from picturing to belief, or from the understanding to reason. And reason is the highest power of the soul.

To restrict ourselves to the difference between reason and understanding, we see that reason is superior to understanding. As for understanding, it is the level in which hypotheses rule, and images and objects are employed. Reason is the level on which a knowledge is attained by the power of dialectic. And though hypotheses are used as steps or points of departure to a world above hypotheses, the soul soars beyond hypotheses to the first principle of the whole, that is the Idea of ideas. And the soul therefrom descends from ideas, through ideas, and ends in ideas.

Herein we see a unity of both views of reason: namely the faculty-view and the praxis-view; for the comparison is based upon the clearness of knowing, and then the clearest is regarded as having its root in the Good itself, whereas the rest lack such a decisive relation to the Good. While reason emancipates itself from hypotheticalal thinking, the understanding is compelled to stay within it. While reason lives

soaring to the Good, and descending to ideas, the understanding is confined to things themselves.⁽¹⁾ As far as reason is "dialectic", that is the movement of thought towards the ultimate, i.e. the Good, it is a progress to the limits of the intellectual world.⁽²⁾ And seen as the progress from the lower to the highest, reason owes its power also to its lower function which is the understanding:

"This power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is the best in existence, -- this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been described."⁽³⁾

This relation between the understanding and reason does not call for a certain self-inclusive basic science for philosophy. It is primarily based upon the will to "give meaning" and the will to "unite" all sciences in terms of the totality of thought; that is to say, it is considered on the basis of the value of the understanding for reason, and the Republic states:

"Now, when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion and connexion with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects; otherwise there is no profit in them."⁽⁴⁾

In brief, in the Socrates-Plato structure, reason is understood simultaneously as both praxis and faculty. Aristotle says:

1. On the division of line, see The Republic, 509-511, and The Republic of Plato, by F. Macd. Cornford, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 25th printing, 1964, p. 222f.

2. See The Republic, 532b.

3. Cit. 532c

4. Cit. 531cd

"Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definition; Plato accepted his teaching."⁽¹⁾ We are employing the term 'praxis' not as under the Aristotlean category of the "ethical" at all. It is the praxis in the following sense.

Man as soul is caught up in the awareness of Being, and thus he finds himself as "ignorant" or lost in its light. And again, being seized by the consciousness of a crisis of being as lost, he tries to trace the lost order between Being and the world, whose loss he comes to accept as his own responsibility. To start with the understanding, man, urged by the ground-experience, tries to give order to "the given". Thus he carries out tasks of identifying, differentiating, classifying, comparing, evaluating, legislating, intending, totalizing and signifying.

These procedures are part of the attempt to find out the order of Being. But since they are not capable of filling the gulf of ignorance "engraved" on the soul, man is constantly prepared to destroy all their achievements because he realizes that they are not yet Being itself. Their achievements are only his response to the surpassing power of Being. The achieving and the destroying find meaning only from their relationship with the soul itself, and the soul finds meaning only from its authentic relationship with the surpassing world. Only within the latter, can reasoning find itself meaningful and whole. In other words,

1. Metaphysics, 987b, cited from The Basic Work of Aristotle, tr. by R. McKeon, Random House, N.Y.

reasoning reaches its limits only when it reflects on itself in order to find itself as what is produced from the fundamental concern of the soul. It is praxis because it rests, in the last resort, upon the soul's response to the surpassing.

Now, on the other hand, reason comes to be as a faculty. It is a faculty in the sense that it is objectifiable for comparison with such fixed forms as identifying, differentiating, classifying, comparing, evaluating, legislating, intending, totalizing and signifying. Comparison requires objectification. Therefore reason is made a faculty and objectified for the need of signification, and the signification is for the need to order the soul. But in Socrates-Plato's thought, this relation between reason-as-praxis and reason-as-a-faculty did not find any thorough discussion, and this is probably because the awareness of the surpassing was so overwhelming that thought was more compelled to raise the issue of differentiation rather than the urge to give meaning.

Aristotle is the founder of the standpoint which views reason as a faculty. In Socrates and Plato, reason is conceived of as consisting of two poles. At one pole, reason finds itself in communion with the "surpassing", at the other pole, it is objectified. In Aristotle, however, reason is regarded entirely as "an object" or as a part of the soul. Such an objectification of reason goes along with the idea that, in contrast to the soul, the world of beings rests upon its own substantial ground, which is "the reason of beings". And through the activity of contemplation, the soul's reason is to see the reason of beings. And then this relation between the two is regarded as necessary as is the relation between the lover and the loved. None of Aristotle's predecessors

has ever carried out so thoroughly the Greek idea of the conformity between the subjective and the objective as he did. And this idea as set by him is dominant until the advent of Jaspers' awareness of the encompassingness of being.

In the following, we shall describe how Aristotle comes to establish the view of reason as a faculty. In Socrates and Plato we have seen the decisiveness of the ground-experience of the thought. But in Aristotle we shall see that all the modes of the Greek ground-experience come to be regarded as exhaustible by a historical interpretation, and to be fixed as ideas such as eternity (aidion--Greek), invariability (aphthartos--Greek), or deity (theon) and so on. This transformation of the ground-experience into idea means that Thought leaves aside the awareness of the man's total living relationship with the surpassing, it also clarifies how Thought is idealized in accord with this range of its transitory achievements.

And thus the interaction between the idealization and scientific approach to beings, in particular to the soul, brings forth a rational systematization of the cosmos, the basic attitude of the subject to the object comes to be seen as contemplation (theōreia) in contrast to praxis. And in the last resort the theoretical achievement by contemplation is considered as the "actuality" which is "possession" (hexis) of the soul; and then the ideal state of the soul is that the soul is liberated from all other human concerns but seeing or contemplating the eternal. Therefore, what Dilthey says about Plato's doctrine of ideas should have been said rather about Aristotle:

"Here, however, steps forward, on the other hand, the boundary of the Greek spirit. The true nature of inner-experience was not yet in its horizon. For the Greek spirit, all knowing is a sort of beholding; for it, theoretical as well as practical attitude is concerned with a being opposite to contemplation, and has this being as presupposition; accordingly, for it, knowing is, like acting, the contact of intelligibility with something outside it, and indeed knowing is the acceptance of what stands opposite to it."⁽¹⁾

In Plato, 'ignorance' is the conception of the limitation of knowing by means of objectification.⁽²⁾ Aristotle's concept of ignorance shows how his thought is fundamentally determined by his attitude of objectifying. Aristotle says about ignorance:

"And the ignorance which is contrary to any knowledge leads to an object contrary to the object of the knowledge; but what is primary has no contrary."⁽³⁾

This passage seems definitely directed at Plato's argument in The Republic⁽⁴⁾, where Plato refers to the ignorance that corresponds to non-being. The point of Aristotle's passage is that, if we replace the Good by "What is primary", the ultimate being is nothing but an object of knowledge, because Aristotle sees nothing that is not the object of knowledge, even the ultimate itself is an object of knowledge. Now Aristotle's attitude to knowledge determines the characteristic of his thought as a whole, and consequently his view of reason rests upon it. We shall inquire into the structure of this view by focusing on his conception of contem-

1. G.S. 1. Band, s. 188.

2. See Apology, 21; and also The Republic, 517bc.

3. Metaphysics, 1075b.

4. 477ab.

plation.

Aristotle starts his Metaphysics with an idealization of the relation between the sense of sight and knowing, and therein lies the motive for the idealizing of the tradition of the ground-experience that prevailed in his great predecessors, so we cite:

"All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are lived for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one may say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings light to many differences between things."⁽¹⁾

We are reminded that the famous first sentence of this passage has been much talked of mostly without reference to the other passage. But, as Aristotle himself emphasizes, if such words as "senses", "usefulness", "sight", "thing", or "difference" were cut off, then one could hardly see the weight of the first sentences.

What is dominant in Aristotle is the 'will-to-know'. To know means first of all taking a thing or being as a mere object grasping it within the function of sensation whose ideal form is the sense of sight. Every being whether considered to be the physical, mental or spiritual must be clarified as an object. Hence there should be no knowledge without 'identity' and 'difference'.

Further, Aristotle ascribes this pattern to empirical science. But in order for Aristotle to extend this objectivism to the realm of

1. Metaphysics, 980a.

the wholeness of the world, such ideas as 'the eternal', 'imperishable', etc. must play the part of guiding stars for thought. Thus on the ground of the interaction of the natural attitude and those 'ideas' gained through the sublimation of the Greek ground-experience, knowledge which starts from sensation seeks to grasp the eternal order of all beings. And also it follows that the realm of beings is divided into the idealizable and unidealizable, and the variations of beings are identified, classified and related in accordance with the degree of 'value' within the scale of these metaphysical ideas. Scientific knowledge is interpreted as the eternal 'essence' of beings. And in this way the generalization of the world of essence leads to the Supreme Being.

Thus Aristotle includes beings within the divine or eternity, and names this aspect, cause (aition). Cause is the ground of beings, and, Aristotle holds, in order to be posited in the final being of eternity, the cause has to be divided into four kinds: cause of form, cause of matter, cause of movement and cause of finality. And again these causes are valued in accordance with the superiority of the eternal. Since the cause of matter is to be subjected to the cause of form, and likewise the cause of movement is subjected to the cause of finality, the most essential of the causes are the cause of substance and the cause of finality. Hereupon, the direction towards the eternity in a being is bound to lead to the existence of the highest or the primary cause of being on which all others depend, and it must be the one, that is, there is only one starting-point (archē) to which all other senses of being

are referred.⁽¹⁾ And this he calls substance (ousia). Namely, viewed from eternity a being consists of its substance, and thus indicates the essence or the "why" of a being and also its accidentality (symbebēkos).⁽²⁾

Substance is what makes it possible to identify a being. And next, such substance is divided into three kinds: that is, sensible but eternal, sensible and perishable, and immovable.⁽³⁾ The first two are at one in the sensibility and movement accompanying them: and by "eternal" here Aristotle thinks of the visible eternity, i.e. heavenly bodies or stars; and by "perishable", he takes plants and animals for example; by "immovable", he means the intelligible, reasonable or supersensible. Aristotle further defines the sensible by attaching the idea of "changeability (metabolē)". That is, all sensible substances are changeable, and this process is explained as a movement from what is potential to what is actual.⁽⁴⁾ And the cause of the changeability lies in the fact that the being is composed of matter, but not in the sense that matter is changeable by itself. The substance or the form and the matter are not changeable, and there must be the third thing that makes them change. The matter is what is in privation (Sterēsis) and therefore in potentiality. The form is the source of change (archē) and at the same time it is the actuality (energeia) that is, the purpose (to hou heneka). For this reason the matter seeks the form that it lacks, and so reaches perfection; and this transition from potentiality to actuality

1. Metaphysics, 1003b.

2. See Metaphysics, 1017b10-1018a, 1007a, 1026b1-1027a.

3. See Metaphysics, 1069a

4. See cit. 1069a.

is considered as the change or movement.

Aristotle holds that 'intelligibility' is prior to all other parts of a being. The "substance" of a being is the "formula" (logos). And this logos is what causes the movement from the potency to the actuality.⁽¹⁾ Therefore, a being is a "substance" in the sense that it is a concrete actuality which matter as potency reaches by being caused by the form. Thus it is the movement that makes a being possible. The world of sensibility is of the change within such a movement caused by the form.

Now the question is, from where is this movement? Within the relation between substance and matter, none of these is the movement in itself. Again Aristotle keeps soaring further by having recourse to the idea of eternity. As we have seen, a being which is in process of change has the eternal as its source of change. For this reason the eternal, though it is complete actuality, is also in matter, and there is no separation between the two. They are separated only in relation to the thought that cannot but objectify everything. As a thing, the eternal and the changeable are one. But as a principle seen by the knower, they are different to one another. And furthermore they are not the movement in itself, though they are one through the movement.⁽²⁾

First, in his Physics, Aristotle holds that time is the "number" of movement, or an attribute, or state of movement; "For things

1. See cit. 1070a21.

2. See Physics, 193b3, 194a12.

both come into being in time and pass away, and grow, and are altered in time and are moved locally."⁽¹⁾ And he goes on to say that such time is the movement of the sphere or the circular movement that is eternal.⁽²⁾ Aristotle's discussion of the circular movement seems to be the most confusing one, but here we see the functioning of the Greek ground-experience which is now transformed into mere ideas. At any rate, Aristotle comes to think that there cannot be movement unless the mover and the moved are made to meet by "eternal movement" which is neither the actuality nor the potency of them. In order to be really eternal, and yet in order to be an objective being, such a prior movement of the primary movement ought to be a sort of being which is without matter but possessing actuality as its own "substance". Here Aristotle thinks of it as a sort of being which seeks its own actuality because it is possessed by a belief in eternity:

"But if there is something which is capable of moving things or acting on them, but is not actually doing so, there will not necessarily be movement; for that which has a potency need not exercise it. Nothing, then, is gained even if we suppose eternal substance, as the believers in the Forms do, unless there is to be in them some principle which can cause change; nay, even this is not enough, nor is another substance besides the Forms enough; for if it is not act, there will be no movement. Further, even if it acts, this will not be enough, if its essence is potency; for there will not be eternal movement, since that which is potentially may possibly not be. There must, then, be such a principle, whose very essence is actuality. Further, then, these substances must be without matter; for they must be eternal, if anything is eternal. Therefore they must be actuality."⁽³⁾

1. See cit. 223a30.

2. See cit. 223b10-30.

3. Metaphysics, 1071b10-20.

Aristotle continues to seek the eternal order of beings. If there must be a being that is independent of matter and yet remains as an actuality for all change, then it is nothing but a movement, and it must also be circular movement because it has nothing to do with the movement of matter. Aristotle sees such a movement in that of the stars. But even the primary movement of the heaven, though its substance is actuality, is not yet the ultimate actuality in itself, because Aristotle sees the variations of the movement in the stars, and also believes in a hierarchy of the movements among spheres, whose number, he thought, will be forty-seven or fifty-five. Therefore all the movements but one are what is both moved and moving. So there must be the first heaven that moves without being moved. And this is the eternal and the actual-

ity.⁽¹⁾ Now Aristotle has arrived at the first cause of all beings. And this Being of beings, too ought to be objectively identified, and the last word for it is: "This can in no way be otherwise than as it is."⁽²⁾ Therefore it is of necessity and does not exist in movement but only in a single way.

In the preceeding discussion, we have considered the rise in Aristotle of the view of reason as a faculty as it is developed out of the Greek ground-experience. It is natural that any ground-experience, even if it is surpassing the faculty of objectification, should be expressed by means of an idea. Aristotle is the first systematizer who holds the relation between the two to be of identity. Namely Aristotle's

1. See Metaphysics, 1073b

2. Metaphysics, 1072b8

fundamental presupposition is that the ground of Being is to be identical with the idea of it. Not only the ground experience that Plato is constantly aware of but also the definition of a thing too is regarded as identical with the object. Therefore it follows that the totality of what is given as well as what a man lives is thought of as a system of ideas founded upon the necessity of identification between the object and the knowledge of it. Thus the totality of the world is subjected to thought and delivered over to objective systematization. When Plato tends to separate 'eidos' from the appearance, he sees a gulf existing between the two. Such a fundamental attitude to the world is an idealization of a scientific approach to what is "given". In Plato scientific knowledge is what is signified in the light of an awareness of the surpassing. But Aristotle sublimates this awareness and, instead of putting his scientific approach into the ground of signification, employs it as the rule for thought. The object comes to be regarded as simply as what is given to the abstracting faculty of the reason.

The above-mentioned idea of the Greek ground-experience comes to work as the other determinate moment for maintaining the systematic nature of Aristotle's objective approach to a being as well as to the being-ness of beings. Without the will-to-eternalize, a merely scientific generalization could not lead to a system of metaphysics. In brief, in Aristotle, the structure of being in relation to a man is delivered over to the mechanism of scientific abstraction. So reason is conceived as the essence of the soul and as the soul's faculty which the soul possesses and enjoys the eternal Being who is the primary mover of the universe. So reason is man's potency desiring the actuality of the

primary Reason. Aristotle calls this way to the primary Reason "Contemplation (theoreia)", and the end of human existence is thought of as a state of contemplation. And this fixing of the soul on a contemplative life is what prepares the way for medieval Catholicism as well as for the alienation of the natural from the human sciences in the modern world.

However, a thought is not necessarily identical with what a thinker actually lives, and Aristotle, too, is not an exception. Aristotle, who criticises Plato's doctrine of ideas as "empty words and poetical metaphors"⁽¹⁾, comes to speak about the pure mover of beings in poetical language which is almost wholly alogical, alogical because he ascribes to such a being life, value, pleasure and even perception. Let us conclude this part of the discussion by citing a rather long passage from *Metaphysics*:

"On such a principle, then depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence is thought. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If,

1. *Metaphysics*, 991a20-23.

then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God."⁽¹⁾

(b) Aquinas' evaluation of the faculty-view

In Thomas Aquinas, we are to see a significant valuation of the faculty-reason orientated by Aristotle. And this valuation is carried out in relation to Christianity. Christianity presents itself as 'revelation' in the sense that all ground-experiences find their final fulfilment in the fact that God discloses Himself to man. During its dialogue with the history of philosophies, Christianity has proved to be enough to meet even the goal of Greek thinking. But in Aquinas the relation between Christianity and Aristotlean philosophy must not be taken as though he simply applied Aristotle's system to Christian faith, for it is not true to identify the faith with any formulation of its doctrines; nor is it true to identify the Christian God with any objectified form of Him. And as for the Aristotlean system, Aquinas shows his obvious dependence upon what was achieved by the former rather than upon what was going on as a whole. However, it may be said that Aquinas is a radical Aristotlean to the extent that he carries out a transformation of the Christian ground-experience from which, for example, Augustine was compelled to see the 'eschaton' of history, and Anselm confessed that he

1. Metaphysics, 1072b10-25.

sees in faith the power which urged him to engage in reason. In Aquinas a hidden belief in the conformity between knowledge and its object is so dominant that the ground-experience comes to be heterogeneously transformed. In order to see Aquinas' valuation of faculty-reason, we shall restrict ourselves to point out first how he considers reason to be a faculty, and next how he comes to deify it by confining the ground experience to the realm of objective thought.

God, who, for Aristotle, was considered as Idea or 'eternity', is now in Aquinas considered as the subject-matter of the revealed doctrines which he calls "articulus fidei" and regards as "authority based on divine revelation"⁽¹⁾. That is to say, God is regarded first of all as objectified in the doctrines. Therefore faith is identified with a belief in the doctrines. And the objective relation between belief and the revealed doctrines becomes the ground of thought: the doctrines are to be the principles from which Thought must start, and belief is what keeps human reason within the order of beings, which is graded in accordance with what is taught through the doctrines. The basic division of cosmos is the Creator and the created. And Aquinas considers the Creator as one who "is outside genus and is the principle of every genus".⁽²⁾ Therefore the comparative-thinking in which God is an object or being goes always along with Aquinas' belief in the excessus of God.⁽³⁾ However, this consciousness of God's "excess" does not affect Aquinas' all-embracing view-point that everything, whether it is the object of belief

1. Thomas Aquinas: The Summa Theologica, tr. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, revised by D. Sullivan, William Benton, Publisher; Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952, First Part Q. 1, Art. 7, answer.

2. Cit. Q.6, Art. 2, Reply Obj. 3.

3. See cit. *ibid.*, and see Q. 12, Art. 1, Reply Obj. 3.

or cognition, cannot be considered as other than a being whose relation to a man is finally accomplished insofar as it is applied to the object and exhausted as such, saying:

"Now a relation by which something is said of God in relation to creature is not really in God but in the creature, for it is in God in our idea only."⁽¹⁾

Depending entirely upon Aristotle's epistemological doctrines, Aquinas defines a man as an intellectual creature⁽²⁾, and God as "the author of the intellectual power" or "the first intellect (primus intellectus)".⁽³⁾ First, Aquinas starts by holding that "It is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible things, because all our knowledge originates from sense."⁽⁴⁾ Now the question is how such sensibly determined knowledge comes to be unified into the highest state of knowledge that is ready to encounter the ultimate intellect which belongs to God. Aquinas' fundamental argument about the relation between the cognitive object and the subject lies in that "knowledge (cognitio) occurs according as the thing known (cognitum) is in the knower (cognoscens)", and that "the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower."⁽⁵⁾ And the mode of being of things is manifold: (a) there are things whose beings are bound up with "this one individual matter", (b) there are things whose natures subsist of themselves, not

1. Cit. Q. 6, Art. 2, Reply Obj. 1.

2. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 1 ans.

3. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 2 ans.

4. Cit. Q. 1, Art. 9 ans.

5. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 4 ans.

residing in matter at all, "which, however are not their own being, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels", (c) and God is the only being to which it belongs to be His own subsistent being (suum esse subsistent).⁽¹⁾ Now a man is regarded as consisting of "form" and "matter", and the form is that through which he knows. Therefore it is "connaturale" for a man to know what is bound up with matter. But again man's cognitive power is divided into two, i.e. the act of a corporeal organ and the intellect; therefore sense knows the particular and the intellect knows the "nature" of the material thing. And this "nature" is the universal which is known through an intellectual abstraction from the matter.⁽²⁾ "All knowledge comes from form", he holds.⁽³⁾ However the mode of Gods being exceeds the nature of the knower that is a man, therefore man's intellect finds itself impossible to know God;

"That to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone, and that it is beyond the natural power of any created intellect.....Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect as an object made intelligible to it."⁽⁴⁾

In order that the cognitive relation between the world of beings which culminates in God and man as the knower is to be accomplished, the created intellect that is limited by matter and yet desires to reach the first cause of things⁽⁵⁾, must have its perfection explained. Aquinas

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1. Ibid.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 1, Reply Obj. 1.
 4. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 4, ans.
 5. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 1, ans.

characterizes the cognition of God by comparing it to the relation between form and the intellect. Cognition, Aquinas holds, is achieved by the union (unio) of the intelligible form and the intellect, and likewise "the divine essence is united to the created intellect as the thing actually understood, by itself making the intellect in act (actu)".⁽¹⁾ Now in order for the intellect to see the divine essence in its intelligible form, it must be prepared by some supernatural disposition and thus it must be helped with "the illumination of the intellect".⁽²⁾ Aquinas calls this illuminated state of the intellect "deiformis", that is to be made the form of God.⁽³⁾ In this way, "by the light of glory" one comes to have "the faculty of seeing God".⁽⁴⁾

Aquinas, however, does not promise that this faculty is sufficient to attain to the perfect mode of knowledge of the divine intellect, because God is infinitely "knowing" whereas the finite intellect, even though the light of glory is added to it, cannot include the infinite being. That is to say, as far as the divine essence is concerned, "the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows."⁽⁵⁾ Aquinas goes on to argue that insofar as the soul has its being in corporeal matter, it is not capable of seeing "the vision of his essence"; and hence he proceeds to separate the faculty-reason from the very context which is the ground for his scientific objectivism, saying:

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1. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 2, Reply Obj. 3.
 2. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 5, ans.
 3. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 5, Reply Obj. 3, and see Q. 12, Art. 13, ans.
 4. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 6, ans.
 5. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 7, Reply Obj. 3.

"This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things.

"Hence in dreams and withdrawals from the bodily senses divine revelation and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly."⁽¹⁾

In the next we are considering how this new valuation of the faculty-reason leads to Aquinas' transformation of the Christian ground-experience. Aquinas' thought relates the Greek thought and Christianity by means of a radical simplification of the connection between the two. It is the faculty-reason which is the common ground on which both are made to interact, and this interaction results in a heterogeneous transformation of Christianity, heterogeneous because Christianity becomes wholly subjected to an objectifying procedure. The significance of Aquinas' thought rests upon his choice of the faculty-reason; and the consequence is that the Christian ground-experience is confined within a concept of objective knowledge, and that this concept comes to be "deified" as absolute truth. No doubt Christianity must not reject an objectifying itself. But this does not mean that such objective knowledge is prior to, or identifiable with, the fundamental awareness of the relationship between man and God. The Biblical attitude to this fundamental relationship seems well expressed in the following statements by J.L. Leuba:

"In the Old Testament 'to know' implies observation and intellectual grasp, but it also has another and far more significant meaning: to encounter, to experience, to share in.

1. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 11, ans.

"The Old Testament writers are less concerned with grasping an object by means of the 'idea' of it than they are with allowing themselves to be encountered by a reality which invades the inner recess of the personality of the 'subject' himself and draws him into its control."⁽¹⁾

"Paul and John (throughout the whole of his Gospel and his Epistle) remind their hearers that knowledge is not a faculty added to man which he uses at will, but that it springs from faith in the historic revelation of God in Jesus Christ."⁽²⁾

If this is admitted, then Aquinas' thought can be seen as a reduction of the Christian ground-experience to objective knowledge; and this desire for fixed, or transformed faith, whether consciously or not, comes to determine the succeeding ages of thought in relation to a Christian ground-experience as well as to a humanist ground-experience. Let us consider further this point. Aquinas tends to isolate objective knowledge from the context of faith and absolutizes the comparative-thinking which was typical of Aristotle. Aquinas holds that philosophies must be used as the "handmaiden" for what he calls "sacred doctrine"⁽³⁾, and he is frequently blamed for this. But as far as his philosophical attitude to the Christian ground-experience is concerned, it must be said that it is the Christian ground-experience that is used as handmaiden for Aquinas' philosophy. This is because Aquinas carried out thought on the ground of doctrinizing the world of Christian faith. Aquinas takes the Christian revelation as identical with what is written about it, and it is then identified as teaching or

1. Cited from Vocabulary of the Bible ed. by J.J. Von Allmen, Lutterworth Press, London, 4th impression, p. 221.

2. Cit. p. 223.

3. See The Summa Theologica, First Part Q. 1. Art. 5.

doctrine.⁽¹⁾ And he proceeds to deal with this doctrine as "principle" for his excessively Aristotlian metaphysical reasoning, as he says:

"In this way sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles by the light of a higher science, namely the science of God and the blessed. (Note that God too is regarded as a subject of knowledge or science).

"Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science believes the principles revealed to it by God."⁽²⁾

(The bracketed is by the present author.)

In this way, through a simple objectification, the faith-relationship within the ground-experience comes to be replaced by belief in the 'principles'. And further these principles which are isolated and objectified come to be considered as "infallible truth"⁽³⁾ and as what "transcends human reason"⁽⁴⁾. And eventually the system which is based upon these principles requires an authority identical to that of God, and he says:

"This doctrine (Aquinas' philosophy) is wisdom above all human wisdoms, not merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise man to order and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher cause, he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest cause in that order."⁽⁵⁾

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1. See cit. Art. 2, answering.
 2. Cit. First Part Q. 1, Art. 2, answering.
 3. Cit. First Part Q. 1, Art. 8, ans.
 4. Cit. First Part Q. 1, Art. 5, ans.
 5. Cit. First Part Q. 1, Art. 6, ans.

Thus not only these principles but also the thought-system founded upon them is deified, and Aquinas, on the ground of the higher value of its subject-matter, goes on to argue the superiority of this system over other philosophies and ascribes to it divine certitude and even "eternal happiness" (beatitudo aeterna)⁽¹⁾. He distinguishes it from what he calls "created intellect" or "natural reason", saying:

"Now one speculative science is said to be nobler than another either by reason of its greater certitude or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences: in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err, while this derives its certitude from the light of the divine knowledge, which cannot be deceived; in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter, because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcends human reason, while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason's grasp."⁽²⁾

As we have seen in Aristotle, the view of reason as a faculty is characterized by a simple belief in the conformity between object and the essence of it, and even Aristotle was not absolutely certain of his individual's success in the task of contemplation, through which the ultimate Being could be reached. But Aquinas, regardless of his distinction between divine and natural reason, values the faculty-reason as absolute and he "deifies" it.

In such an attitude to the ground-experience as this, Aquinas constitutes a system of a world of beings including God. It is debatable

1. Cit. First Part Q. 1, Art 12, ans.

2. Cit. First Part Q. 1, Art. 5, ans.

whether his system depends solely upon his use of Aristotle or upon an Aristotlian tradition. But as far as his unquestioning acceptance of the restriction of beings to the realm of beings as the objects of an empirically based contemplation, Aquinas' thought must be said to be a doctrinal version of Aristotlianism. And his ordering of beings is shown as determined by Aristotle's science of the soul--particularly by his doctrine of knowledge. Aquinas' employment of Christian doctrines, as we have seen, does not bring forth any substantial change in the framework of the thought. The Christian doctrines are accepted only as "principles", and there is no qualitative distinction between these principles and Aristotle's idea of eternity. As Aristotle's system consists in a will to eternalize beings on the ground of a belief in the "prime mover", so Aquinas' system consists in a will to unite all beings with the doctrinal ideas of Christianity, though these doctrinal ideas themselves are at the same time transformed in accordance with his intellectual view-point.

As for the world of beings, Aquinas makes all beings rest upon God whom he regards as the "immovable and self-necessary first principle."⁽¹⁾ This ascription of beings to God goes along with his reduction of all Christian doctrines to God as the "subject of the principles"⁽²⁾, and he says:

"But in sacred science all things are treated of under the aspect of God, either because they are God Himself, or because they are ordered to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is truly

1. Cit. First Part Q. 2, Art. 3, Reply Obj. 2.

2. Cit. First Part Q. 1, Art. 7, ans.

the subject of this science....The subject of the principles (articles of faith) and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles."⁽¹⁾

For Aquinas, these principles as "the articles of faith" are not proved by arguments from human reason but are to be used as starting-points from which beings are to be "ordered" towards God.⁽²⁾ And his method for doing this is determined by his distinguishing between faith and reason (ratio). By faith he means the acceptance of the objective doctrines as an authority over human reason. And by reason, he means an intellectual process from the senses to knowledge of the first principle of beings.⁽³⁾ And Aquinas considers a man to be intelligible being whose nature is to be fulfilled by the aid of "the infusion of gratuitous light".⁽⁴⁾

Aquinas' "deification" of objective knowledge finds its culmination in his view of the relation of this knowledge to salvation.⁽⁵⁾ Once Christian ground-experience is regarded as a matter of objective knowledge, then it necessarily follows that man's salvation as the goal of the ground-experience is bound up with a form of knowledge. As we have pointed out, Aquinas transforms the totality of the ground-experience into a pattern of doctrinal knowledge which he identifies with the totality of God's revelation. And even God is now no other than an idea or an object of this objectively exhaustive knowledge. And doctrinal knowledge

1. Ibid.

2. Cit. Q. 1, Art. 7, ans., and Art. 8, ans.

3. See cit. Q. 12, Art. 13, Rply Obj. 3, Art. 8, Reply Obj. 4.

4. Cit. Q. 12, Art. 13, ans.

5. See cit. First Part Q. 1, Art. 1

attains absolute and unconditional validity because of the superiority of this idea. Thus there is drawn a sharp line between doctrinal and philosophical knowledge, or between a dogmatic philosophy and other philosophies. Such a dogmatic system is identified as revealed doctrine and regarded as transcending human reason.

On this ground, Aquinas comes to hold that dogmatic philosophy arises not out of human reason but out of revelation. Therefore, if salvation depends on revelation, the dogmatic philosophy is what is necessary for the salvation of man. But since such a philosophy or a contemplation of God is not allowed to everyone, but only to the blessed, the salvation of man is bound up with the dogmatic philosophy of the blessed. And poetic expressions of the ground-experience are regarded as "putting forward divine and spiritual truths under the likeness of material things".⁽¹⁾ Aquinas holds that, different from contemplative knowledge, poetry together with metaphors is for the purpose that "spiritual truths be expounded by means of likeness taken from corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able to understand it."⁽²⁾ This view of poetry is not a mere repetition of Aristotle's view⁽³⁾; it is rooted in Aquinas' view of the dogmatic contemplation. He demonstrates that his thought as a whole is entirely heterogeneous to the truth of the ground-experience, an idea which would be better expressed by Heidegger's view of poetry:

1. Cit. First Part Q.1, Art. 9.

2. Ibid.

3. See De poetica, 1447a.

"In the work (of poetry) is the happening of truth and certainly the manner of the work is up to the work. And therefore the essence of art is already determined by what has planted truth in it. And this determination must be understood in two senses: it implies, on one hand, that art is that which keeps in shape the self-arranging truth that happens in such a creation as brings forth the unconcealment of that which is; and it also implies, on the other hand, that art is that which brings the work-being (Werksein) into movement and happening, which occurs as proving truth. Therefore art is what proves in the work truth by creating itself."⁽¹⁾

In brief, faculty-reason finds itself deified in Thomas Aquinas. First, out of the ground-experience, objective thought is isolated and idealized. Then the ground-experience is sublimated as a mere idea that is eternity, perfection, unchangeability, truth or God. And such an idea is regarded as the subject-matter for the doctrines, which are regarded as absolute authorities and are now employed as the unarguable principles for comparative thought. Faith is, therefore, identified with belief in a doctrine.

Further, the world of nature and of idea are measured and ordered. And the result is that the world of beings is constituted as if it were a static and fixed order. Now reason is regarded as a faculty conformable with such an order of beings. Since God, exhausted within an idea, is the primary principle of this whole order, the reason, if it is strengthened by belief in the doctrines, is "implanted" into the divine intellect and eventually becomes deified.

1. Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, in his Holzwege, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt Am Main, 1950, s. 59.

(c) Kant's formulation of the faculty-view

Faculty-reason comes to find its highest formulation in Kant-- and its collapse in Hegel. But we shall see that neither of them goes beyond Aquinas insofar as the view of reason is fundamentally guided by the same idea derived from the traditional ground-experience, though modern knowledge of various other forms of religion is added to it.

Ever since Thomas Aquinas transformed the Christian ground-experience into an ontological system, the history of thought is shaped by the necessity for a forced dialogue between the growing sciences and the Thomist picture of the ground-experience. This fundamental situation of thought comes to require the consideration of reason chiefly as a faculty. The conflict of the mathematico-physical sciences and the Schoolmen's belief in the identity of being and logic produces new ontology and consequently a new reflection of reason. The split between Continental rationalism and English empiricism can be generally regarded as an inter-party storm within the domain of Thomist ontology. Kant carries out his thought by appealing to "objective validity" and "objective reality". In such a view, in the following we shall consider Kant's formulation of reason as a faculty.

The question raised by the relation of the new scientific attitude to the ground-experience is dictated by the co-existence of belief in the self-authority of science on the one hand, and the certainty of the realm which lies beyond a scientific approach on the other. If objective thought wants to extend its principles to the unobservable object, then it is bound to lose that ground which establishes its

objective validity, that is, it has to admit a truth which has no objective status identical with that of science. The existence of the desire for such an interpretation means the power of a belief in a realm different from that of scientific understanding.

Objective thought retains its basic attitude by differentiating between the two kinds of object. No matter how different they are, insofar as they are considered as "objects", there must be one common ground upon which they can be compared with each other. But if the ground were essentially against the self-authority of the sciences, then it would be beyond consideration. Thus Kant sets up two kinds of objective order: one is the process from the individual being to the general and the other is the process from the subject to the individual. And the common ground for the two, according to Kant, is nothing but "humanity". In conformity with this new structure of the object, the scope of reason is determined; with the former, the understanding, and with the latter, the "practical reason", and with humanity, the "pure reason". And the understanding and the practical, too, have their ground in "humanity".

As seen before, in Aquinas, reason is identified with the divine intellect, but in Kant, reason is restricted within the limits of humanity. A man knows only as far as his faculty of reason can reach. Kant explains this by positing the concept of "Ding an sich" as an object to belief (Glauben)--but not to the understanding. For Kant, the whole measure for examining reason is the unity of the objective validity--the objective reality as manifested in such sciences as geometry and physics. And the validity of these sciences lies in their form of judgment which

is "a priori synthetic judgment". For contrary to analytic judgment, the "a priori synthetic judgment" only is based upon the synthesizing power of the a priori form of the understanding. The object is what is built by the power of the understanding, and in this sense the object is no more than "appearance" of a thing. What is behind such appearance is unknowable.

The world behind appearance is the object of belief, and belief has its objective ground in the practical reason whose faculty is not conceivable without a belief in "freedom". Freedom is not possible without belief in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, because the perfect fulfilment of the "categorical imperative" cannot be thoroughly carried out by a man within this world. And the categorical imperative nor our response to it cannot be conceived without postulating the ultimate being who is the ground of this absolute order.

What belief brings forth is the "postulation" of the ideas; and therefore concerning God, what is allowed to the rational being is not more than to talk about His "existence". Belief in God's existence is only necessary for strengthening man's faithfulness to the "moral law".

Thus we see that in Kant, too, the ground-experience is completely transformed into idea, and especially the idea produced by reasoning, and from this follows Kant's interpretation of Christianity as the "historical religion".

Kant's attitude to the ground-experience as well as to reason should not be considered as a simple logical result of speculative

reasoning. Kant thinks out of a ground-experience. But his perspective is decided by his wonder at the power and scope of the Enlightenment whose hopes were based upon the rationalizing power of man. Everything has to be subjected to this screen. Anything which cannot be is rejected as "superstition" or "fanaticism".⁽¹⁾ Kant speaks prophetically about his hope for the future:

"No generation is allowed to fix itself and form a conspiracy against posterity to confine it to such a state as it becomes unable to move to expand its knowledge--which is particularly so crucial--, to purge errors and in general to proceed ahead in enlightenment. It should be an offence against human nature that is fundamentally destined just for this progress."⁽²⁾

For Kant, to offend against the Enlightenment is to violate the "holy right of humanity".⁽³⁾ And Kant carries out his task of founding the Enlightenment on the restriction of reason to the standard of what is objectively valid and objectively real. Kant closes his Critique of Practical Reason with these poetic words:

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me.

"I do not merely conjecture them and seek them as though obscured in darkness or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon: I see them before me, and associate them directly with the consciousness of my own existence.

"The fall of a stone and the motion of a sling, resolved into their elements and forces manifested in them treated mathematically, finally brought

1. Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklaerung, A481.

2. Cit. A488.

3. Cit. A490.

that clear and henceforth unchangeable insight into the structure of the world which, as observations continue, we may hope to broaden but need not fear having to retract.

"This example recommends to us the same path in treating of the moral capacities of our nature and gives hope of a similarly good issue

"We may analyze them into their elementary concepts, adopting, in default of mathematics, a process similar to that of chemistry."⁽¹⁾

We see here Kant's will to exhaust not only reason but also the ground-experience, and we even hear Kant's triumphal song for his own institution of a tribunal of reason "in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws".⁽²⁾ In 1799, five years after Fichte's "Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre" came out, Kant asserts the completeness of his system:

"But heedless of this, the critical philosophy, by virtue of its inexorable tendency toward the satisfaction of reason, both theoretically and morally-practically, must feel the calling that no change of opinions, no improvements, nor any doctrinal edifice of another form are in store for it; but the system of the critique rests on a complete, assured foundation, firm forever, and is indispensable for the highest aims of humanity also for all ages to come."⁽³⁾

Although Kant is enthusiastic about establishing a universal form for the realization of the perfection of humanity, his thought as a whole emphasizes the realm that is beyond rational identifiability, and though negatively, it is his thought that proves the very power of such a realm.

1. Critique of Practical Reason, 161ff., tr. by L.W. Beck, The Liberal Arts Press, N.Y.

2. Critique of Pure Reason, AX11.

3. Allgemeine Literaturzeitung, 1799, cited from W.Kaufmann's Hegel, Doubleday & Company Inc., 1965, p. 123.

Therefore one may say that in Kant there co-exist two directions: one which is a radically rationalist will to form and, the other is an awareness of a super-rational ground of being, though Kant is not so positively concerned with this aspect as Plato is.

(d) Hegel's accomplishment of the faculty-view and its collapse

Now it follows in turn that Thought comes to direct itself to seek another possibility of rationalizing. In Hegel we see a typical attempt at this possibility. On Hegel; Kierkegaard leads a representative criticism by describing his later years as logism. And Dilthey's "Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels"⁽¹⁾ and Walter Kaufmann's recent existential approach to Hegel⁽²⁾ draw our attention to the figure of Hegel striving to produce a system out of his overwhelming "passion". We shall now consider Hegel's view of faculty-reason by relating it to the structure of the soul or Geist.

Dilthey holds that the significance of Hegel's youth lies in his formation of a pantheistic world-view⁽³⁾, and Kaufmann holds it is in Hegel's idealization of Sophocle's Antigone⁽⁴⁾. And whether pantheistic or reconciliatory, Hegel is inconceivable if ^{there is not} the interaction of Kantian will to the universal and the awareness of the infinitude of the individual reached its climax in Goethe's Faust. His enthusiasm for the

1. 1905, G.S. Band IV.

2. 1965, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, N.Y.

3. See G.S. Bd. IV, s. 54ff.

4. See Hegel p. 69, 142ff.

rational is seen in his break with Schelling, with whom he had shared "objective idealism" or "philosophy of identity". And if his "Phenomenologie" could also be seen as the will to rationalize, and therein lies the reason why Hegel calls the work "System der Wissenschaft" and defines "Wissenschaft", saying:

"The real thought and scientific (wissenschaftliche) insight is to be reached only through the work of concept. Concept only can bring forth the universality of science. And this universality is not either the common ambiguity and poverty of common sense nor the unusual universality of the ability of reason (Vernunft) spoiled by the idleness and self-conceit of genius; but it is refined and complete knowledge (Erkenntnis) and also is the truth that has grown to its hidden form; and this truth is able to become possessions of all the self-conscious reason."⁽¹⁾

However, this drive to rationalize does not mean that Hegel seeks to determine the form by regarding it as revealed in a certain basic science, e.g. mathematics or physics. Hegel does not ascribe the rational to an epistemological faculty, but thinks of it as the nature of "Geist" which he holds to be the dialectical unity of the subjective and the objective. Kaufmann reminds us of the Schillerean characteristic of Hegel's concept of "Geist" and says: "It is not--and this is important for understanding Hegel--primarily an epistemological faculty or organ of knowledge, like 'mind', but above all, though neither Schiller nor Hegel place this most appropriate word in the centre of the discussion where it belongs, a creative force."⁽²⁾ For Hegel, without the individual no universal is conceivable. Though it is questionable

1. Phenomenologie, s.57.

2. His Hegel, p. 54.

whether Hegel comes to replace the Kantian formalism by his "logism", his criticism of the "formalism" seems to be enough to indicate his passion or, according to Kaufmann, "a sense of the Dionysian whirl"⁽¹⁾:

"Now that Kant, by instinct, has rediscovered triplicity, albeit still dead and still uncomprehended, and it has subsequently been raised to its absolute importance, and with it the true form in its true content has been presented and the Concept of science has emerged, it is equally obvious that we must not consider scientific that use of this form which reduces it to a lifeless schema, really to a phantom, and scientific organization to a table."⁽²⁾

Nevertheless, Hegel's thought is primarily orientated by the belief that the totality of things can be exhausted in a conceptual system. Hegel is so convinced of the capacity of such a system that he thinks that:

"The true form in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of it. To contribute to this end, that philosophy might come close to the form of science--the goal being that it might be able to relinquish the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge--that is what I have resolved to try."⁽³⁾

Hegel's thought, despite his dialectical logism, is precisely orientated by the Aristotlean attitude to the ground-experience, and it should be noted that he concludes his Philosophy of Spirit⁽⁴⁾ with a quotation from Aristotle's Metaphysics, and let us quote it here again:

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1. Cit. p. 492.
 2. Phenomenologie, s. 41, tr. by Kaufmann, (cited from his Hegel)
 3. The preface to the Phenomenology, tr. by Kaufmann, cited from his Hegel, p. 372.
 4. Encyclopaedie der philosophischen wissenschaten im Grundrisse III, Philosophie des Geistes, 1817.

"And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God."⁽¹⁾

Now Hegel is prepared to sublimate reason 'out of its relation to the ground-experience. Truth must be comprehended only through concept. Hence he does away with all non-scientific attitudes to the surpassing by judging them as "ecstasy", "sup^Ppressing the discriminating concept", or "modest contentment in accepting or stinginess in giving" improper for science.⁽²⁾ On the same ground, Hegel tends to take poetry as "ignorance", or "crudeness that lacks form".⁽³⁾

By rejecting both intuitive and argumentative approaches to the absolute truth, Hegel establishes a "speculative" system which, he holds, suffices both for the actuality of life and for the demand of

1. XII:7, 1072b, 15ff.

2. See the preface to the Phenomenology, tr. by Kaufmann, p. 374ff.

3. See cit. p. 452.

the conceptual form. Hegel's speculation is motivated first by his awareness of the progressive power of history, especially of his own age:

"It is not difficult to see that our time is a time of birth and transition to a new period. The spirit has broken with what was hitherto the world of its existence and imagination and is about to submerge all this in the past; it is at work giving itself a new form. To be sure, the spirit is never at rest but always engaged in ever progressing motion."⁽¹⁾

Hegel ascribes the whole of this developing history to "the spirit that educates itself" and "matures slowly and quietly toward the new form."⁽²⁾ Now Hegel is furnished with "the resultant simple concept of the whole", that is, the spirit that is the subject of the whole. Then he relates himself to this subject, and comprehends in a unity this new relationship between thought and the spirit. And the unity is interpreted as the spirit that "has returned into itself from succession".⁽³⁾ Now the task set before such a spirit is to find its actuality. Hegel's system is orientated as a new development of the same subject. It is the system that gives form to the concept of the whole. And therefore the first thing to be said about the nature of Hegel's system is that it was originated as the form-giving self-development of the spirit of history. In other words, the object of Hegel's thought is not only "substance" but also "subject". As he says: "Everything depends on this, that we

1. Cit. p. 380.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

comprehend and express the true not as substance but as much as subject."⁽¹⁾
It is subject conceived as the living substance.

Now since the object of the system is subject, the whole thought must be orientated as subject. And at the same time this subjectivity of thought must restrict itself to the demand of its form because it is now subjected to the task of science. The question is how the living substance that is really subject becomes actual being. Hegel derives the concept of "negativity" from the subjective movement of the living substance as subject. Negativity implies the nature of the self-positing of the subjective substance, or the "mediation between a self and its development into something different."⁽²⁾ Through this negativity, Hegel holds, the subject produces its own double and opposition, and again negates this opposite to reconstitute itself by reflecting upon itself. This process is its own becoming. Therefore the absolute is comprehended through a speculative reflection; and this reflection itself is thus the developing movement of the whole, and hence "of the absolute it should be said that it is essentially result."⁽³⁾ Reflection ought to be understood as a positive moment of the absolute.

Now under such a consciousness of sovereignty of Geist, Hegel's system as that of the self becoming itself develops towards a unity with the absolute spirit of the world and history. The forming of the system is the spirit's movement in concept. And Hegel identifies the movement

1. Cit. p. 388.

2. Cit. *ibid*.

3. Cit. p. 390.

as the activity of reason. Therefore, for Hegel, reason is not the faculty that is confined to the limits of subject-object dichotomy, but the faculty that unites subject and object. It is logical movement; but the form of such logic cannot be founded upon the identity between reason and object. Since the movement of spirit comes from negativity, the logic of such a negating and becoming movement is necessarily "dialectical", and Hegel holds:

"Dialectic, the logic of philosophy, is the explication of the Concept in all essential shapes of life, in nature, soul, mind, and spirit.

"The movement of these living contents and the movement of dialectical thought is one and the same movement. In space and time it shines through disappearing appearances, founding, transcending, and preserving them in their true meaning."⁽¹⁾

So much for the demarcation of Hegel's view of reason as it is relevant to his concept of system. Hegel reveals a view of "faculty-reason" in dynamic form. However he, too, links himself with the tradition from Aristotle to Kant by identifying this dynamic form with the dialectical form, and by determining reason as exhausted within a dialectical formulation. Although Hegel regards this nature of spirit as freedom⁽²⁾, this freedom is itself already caught up within the necessity of the "dialectic". Although Hegel deduces the subject-object relation from opposition to "unity", the unity is already based upon the presupposition that object is what is produced by subject, and the unity of them is regarded as the attainment of the perfect identity of knowledge

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1. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, tr. by G.E. Mueller, Philosophical Library, Inc., N.Y. #474.
 2. Cit. #473, and also Reason in History, tr. by R.S. Hartman, The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., p. 14f.

with the spirit that knows.⁽¹⁾

Although Hegel sees reason as determining itself through a spatio-temporal motion, the totality of this motion is identified with a logical system. Reason is what dissolves itself into history, and also what consolidates this self-dissolution into a single logical "simplicity". Therefore the dissolution and the consolidation is in the circular motion of the dialectically rational spirit. Such a view of reason should be taken as the self-perfection of the ideal on which all of the previously mentioned views of what we call the faculty-reason are centred. It is a natural consequence of viewing reason as a faculty.

Comparative-thinking, as we have pointed out, has its limits. Its metaphysical domination from Aristotle to Hegel is accompanied by the isolating of idea from the living context of the ground-experience. Plato sought thought in order to clarify the order of the surpassing; in Plato, the awareness of the surpassing was not exhausted with the idea of it. Like Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant, Hegel sublimates the belief in subjectivity into idea; and the living relationship of the subjectivity of a man comes to lose its "the other" pole which remains challenged by the surpassing.

Thus we are led to a stage of Thought where philosophy speaks out of an immediate awareness of the ground-experience rather than as being mediated by the discipline of developing history. Now, to philosophize is to be concerned with the relation of the philosophizer to the

1. See Hegel: Philosophische Propaedeutik, #208.

ground-experience. It is not to know God, the Ultimate Being, nor does it attempt the all-inclusive knowledge of the order of beings in the universe. But it is to give meaning to man's dynamic relation towards the ground-experience. Comparative knowledge about creatures, culture, history, man's potentiality, is not considered as "being itself", but they are considered as produced in the context of man's relation to the infinitude which is beyond man's representational capability. The objective determination of beings comes to be taken as man's way to Being.

CHAPTER IV

Reason as Praxis

I. Jaspers' attitude to the ground-experience.

In the preceding chapters, we treated the question of reason by bringing it back to the context of the ground-experience. We have led our discussion towards the turning-point at which a restoration of the ground-experience demands a new consideration of reason, which used to be regarded as a "faculty" in respect to the Ground of Being. In this chapter, we shall analyze more closely Jaspers' own view of reason. And we shall carry out this inquiry, paying special attention to the decisive role of a consciousness of history which, as we see it, is a characterizing factor in Jasper's view of reason.

(a) Outline of Jaspers' position relevant to the views of reason as a faculty.

Jaspers regards reason as "praxis". This is essentially bound up with Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's emphasis on the forfeiture of man's authentic being in modern times. Let us trace briefly the process suggested in the preceding discussions.

First, we have concentrated upon 'faculty-views' not because we felt it a crucial problem to call reason a faculty, for our main concern was to examine the relation between a view of reason and an awareness of the Ground of Being, a relation which seems to be the origin of human thought in its metaphysical approach.

As we pointed out above, in Socrates-Plato's thought there is seen no clear-cut view which would identify Being with a knowledge in conformity with it. Aristotle's system seems to be the determining pattern which allows thought to rest upon the belief in the identity of an idea with the ground-experience.

Aquinas employs the same pattern in systematizing the Christian order of life and then he comes to take the Christian ground-experience as identical with a system of theology.

Kant, who stresses the limitations of categorical thinking, refuses to extend such a form of knowledge to the realm of "Ding an sich". But by confining what he calls "Idee" to the realm of reason's "postulate", he too maintains the rule of identity by mediating it with the rule of negation in respect to the world of "Idee".

Hegel builds a new system based upon a form of logic-"dialectic"--in order to meet the desire to achieve the identity with Being.

Dilthey, again, reduces all metaphysical principles to the structural development of "life" which consists of equal moments such as intelligibility, feeling and will. For Dilthey, logos is produced through man's emphasis on intelligibility in living relevance to the other moments. And thus the ground-experience is regarded as "frame of mind" (Gemuetsverfassung). Man's "subjectivity" is understood as prior to "universally valid knowledge".

Now the question is whether man's subjectivity is grounded upon such a psychological relation of "action and reaction" in the field of

history or upon the immediate relationship of person to the Ground of Being.

For Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the subjectivity is not to be reduced merely to its relation to history. They begin with awareness of history as a tradition which has to be denied. They are aware of the domain of self-alienation in their time. Therefore subjectivity's ground is no longer history, but the immediate relationship of the individual person to the eternal Being. All values are nonsense if they claim any validity beyond this subject's relationship to the Ground of Being. When they blame reason for its abstractness, they do so because the Meaning of reason is lost. When they are engaged in reasoning, they do so because their "self" is forced to speak out of the ground-experience.

The question of reason comes to require the task of giving Meaning to reason. The meaning of reason lies in the ground relationship of the self with the eternal Being. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche referred to such a meaning while at the same time pointing out the "forfeiture-ness" of reason. Jaspers accepts their seriousness towards the ground-experience, and also accepts them by interpreting them as having failed in communication. For Jaspers, the question of communication is the decisive and indispensable condition for maintaining the self's relation to the Ground. His emphasis upon communication is inconceivable without his consciousness of history.

- (b) The experiential characteristics of Jaspers' consciousness of history.

In order to see the basic characteristics of Jaspers' attitude to history, we must inquire into the experiential aspect of Jaspers' thought. Jaspers has published a series of autobiographical writings: Philosophical Autobiography⁽¹⁾, Ueber meine Philosophie (On my Philosophy)⁽²⁾, Mein weg zur Philosophie (My Way to Philosophy)⁽³⁾, and Reply to my Critics⁽⁴⁾. His Way to Wisdom (Einfuehrung in die Philosophie)⁽⁵⁾ too could be regarded as of the same kind. Such a repetition of autobiographical writing is not incidental. It comes from his conviction that philosophizing is in Time, as he says:

"For, all philosophy--because it is an activity of the human spirit--is, in its themes as well as its causes, intimately connected with the life of the person who is philosophizing."⁽⁶⁾

"In contradistinction to the sciences which separate the person engaged in research from the substance of his findings, I consider the person engaged in philosophizing inseparable from his philosophic thought.

"Nothing in philosophy is separable from man. The philosophizing person, his basic experience, his actions, his world, his everyday conduct, the forces which speak through him, cannot be disregarded when one accompanies him in his thoughts."⁽⁷⁾

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1. Written for The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, published by Tudor Publishing Co., New York, 1957.
 2. 1941; tr. by Felix Kaufmann, in W. Kaufmann's Existentialism. The original is included in Jaspers' Rechenschaft und Ausblick.
 3. 1951; included in Rechenschaft u. Ausblick.
 4. In The Philosophy of K. Jaspers.
 5. 1950; tr. by R. Manheim, Yale University Press, 1951.
 6. Philosophical Autobiography, p. 5.
 7. Cit. p. 38f.

As we have continually held, Jaspers' view of reason is characterized as related to the "immediacy" which was restored by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Further, Jaspers' way of relating reason to that immediacy is determined by his conviction of "historicity" of man. Before discussing this question, let us restrict our discussion to Jaspers' personal views in respect to the basic nature of his consciousness of historicity.

Concerning the aim of his autobiographical writings, Jaspers says that he wants to interpret his works as reactions to situations of life, and that he wants to do this in order "to make their timeless meaning felt".⁽¹⁾ Of his reflection upon his youth, those statements about his relation to his family, in particular to his parents and his wife, must be noted first. The following passages show us that the structure of his thought as a whole consists of a sort of morality.

"If I look upon my whole spiritual development, I seem to see something which has remained the same from my childhood on.

"The basic disposition of youth has clarified itself in the course of life, enriched in content by knowledge of world; but there have never taken place any changes of conviction, no breaks, no crises, no regeneration.

"The only great turning-point in my life was the union which my wife and I concluded with each other. In this union what had been there before was not merely strengthened but infinitely expanded.

"I lived out of the heritage of the parental home. With all later insight I could always let the light fall there in order to bring it to full consciousness."⁽²⁾

(Underlined by the present author)

1. Cit. p. 5.

2. Cit. p. 84.

Jaspers experiences a unity of "love", "reason", "faith", and "eternity" through his relationship with the family. And how? He explains:

On his father: "He regarded me--by his example as well as in decisive moments, by his judgment--in a spirit of reason, reliability, and faithfulness."⁽¹⁾

On his mother: "It was her infinite love which made my childhood and that of my brother and sister sunny and our later years exceedingly happy. Her boundless vigor and spirit filled us with courage and determination; her deep understanding of our aims and ideals, which far transcended all conventionality, stimulated our enthusiasm; her wisdom gave us warmth and the assurance of security."⁽²⁾

On his wife: "In her my own affirmation of life encountered the spirit who from now on would prevent any premature acquiescence on my part. Now philosophy began, in a new way, to become a serious concern for me.

The gloom and consciousness of constant danger induced an inseparable seriousness in her. But out of this soil grew the infinite happiness of her immediate presence. I experienced the deepest satisfaction of love which has been able to give meaning to each day even until now."⁽³⁾

Each of these persons is described as representing what is most valuable in a polaric unity of love and reason. Jaspers experienced the power and the "imperative" of this unity through experiencing the threat of German National Socialism against his beloved Jewish wife and her family.⁽⁴⁾

1. Cit. p. 6.

2. Cit. p. 6.

3. Cit. p. 12.

4. See cit. p. 61.

The significance of this basic attitude in relation to the formation of Jaspers' thought can be seen when we give our attention to the fact that the same attitude remained in his early relation to the ecclesiastical world. And this will show us the reason why he comes to hold the polaric unity of immediacy and reason. According to the autobiography, Jaspers was brought up in an environment of so-called Fundamentalist Christianity. He recollects the religious instruction in his childhood, and regards it as "ridiculous". As a Gymnasium senior, with confirmation some years behind him, he came to have the idea that "for the sake of veracity" he would have to leave the church. On hearing of Jaspers' intention to leave the church, his father says:

"My boy, you may, of course, do as you please. But, in your own mind you are not yet clear about what you mean to do.

"You are not alone in the world. Co-responsibility requires that the individual should not simply go his own way. We can only live together with our fellowmen, if we conform to the regulations.

"Religion is one of the regulative forces. If we destroy it, unforeseeable evil will break through.

"That much lying is connected with the church as, indeed, with all human institutions, in this I agree with you.

"The situation will be different, perhaps, once you are seventy years of age. Before death, when we are no longer active in the world, we may clear the deck by leaving the church."⁽¹⁾

His father did this himself when he was past seventy. He left the church in condemnation of the ecclesiastical distortion of morality, i.e. "love".

1. Cit. p. 76.

He says to the pastor:

"A few years ago a young man committed suicide. The church publicized a condemnation of suicide. A clergyman refused to conduct the funeral. I thought: What empowers the church to such condemnation? And how can you, unable to reach the dead any longer, so torture his relatives!"⁽¹⁾

Jaspers add to say:

"When my father lay dying, in his 90th year, and was taking leave, he opined to his pious woman physician, who had been close to him: Faith, love, hope, it says--of faith I do not think highly."⁽²⁾

In this way, the ecclesiastical world is to be interpreted in accordance with reason, and reason accepts love as the "unconditional imperative". Through the awareness of love as the unconditional imperative, thought is related to eternity. And reason is called for by the challenge of love as the unconditional imperative. Therefore, reason is implanted in the structure of man's spirit which is submerged in eternity. That is to say, love as the unconditional imperative nails a man to the ground of eternity. Hence, as for reason, it gains meaning only because a man undertakes the task of love. Therein we already see an awareness of eternity mediated by morality. And also we see Jaspers' basic view that reason is bound to man's relation with the eternal ground which reveals itself through the unconditional imperative. In short, as far as the basic relation to the Ground is concerned, Jaspers' thought is fundamentally bound up with the will to rest upon it through

1. Cit. p. 76f.

2. Cit. p. 77.

rational mediation.

In such a view, in order to clarify the nature of reason in its relation to the Ground-experience, Jaspers' conception of the unconditional imperative must be described first. Herein we shall see how basically Jaspers' thought is bound up with a consciousness of historicity.

By the "unconditional imperative", Jaspers means a demand which asks a man to choose to risk his life. It comes to a man as the answer to the question "What shall I do?". It is referred to the aim of action. A man may experience such an imperative as arising from some unquestioned practical interest, (i.e. utility), or from an authority he must obey. But, Jaspers holds, man's empirical existence is no ultimate end, and such authority remains unquestioned and hence unexamined. Therefore all such imperatives are conditional, for they rest upon something outside the subject of action. The emptiness of all these has already been pointed out by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. "And the only escape from this emptiness is for man himself as an individual to win authentic being as the foundation of his decisions."⁽¹⁾

Therefore, the unconditional imperative must be what comes from within the self.⁽²⁾ It must be the command of my authentic self. This imperative precedes all other aims. Therefore, such imperatives cannot be regarded as objects of our will but rather as its source. If my practical aims and authority are not unconditional, then uncondi-

1. Way to Wisdom, p. 53.

2. Cit. p. 55.

tional imperatives must have their source in myself. It is the unconditional imperative through which I become aware of my authentic being or of what I ought to be. Thus when we become aware of the imperative our questioning ceases in the certainty of being. Therefore a man is concerned with it only in faith.

"The unconditional is a foundation of action and hence not an object of knowledge but an element of faith. In so far as I know the reasons and aims of my action, I am infinite, I am subject to conditions. Only when I live by something else can no longer be explained by object knowledge do I live by the unconditional."⁽¹⁾

Now what should be the content of such imperatives? Jaspers understands it as the choice of the "good" in the decision between good and evil. However for Jaspers, the decision between good and evil rests no longer upon a merely ethical doctrine of good or evil. It must be the decision between "being" and "non-being". It is, therefore, a metaphysical decision. That is to say, it is the question of the will whether to thrust to real being or to the destruction of being. And Jaspers comes to identify this opposition with the opposition between love and hate.⁽²⁾

When the unconditional imperative is identified with love, love is what leads thought to faith in the eternal. Jaspers characterizes the unconditional as relating man to the eternal, stating in three ways:

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1. Cit. p. 55f.
 2. Cit. p. 59ff.

(1) "It means to partake in the eternal, in being. Accordingly, it implies absolute reliability and loyalty, which derive not from nature but from our decision. The decision is arrived at only through lucidity which is the product of reflection Overpowering as it may be, no mode of passion, of vital will, of self-assertion, is unconditional in the moment; all are relative and hence perishable.

(2) "The unconditional imperative has reality in the man who follows it in faith and awareness. It cannot be proved, cannot be shown to exist empirically in the world--historical proofs are mere intimations. What we know is always conditional. The unconditional within us has no existence if we apply the yardstick of demonstrable knowledge.

(3) "The unconditional is timeless in time.... In our temporal existence the unconditional attitude is manifested in the experience of extreme situations and in situations when we are in danger of becoming untrue to ourselves. But the unconditional itself is never entirely temporal. Whenever it may be, it also cuts across time."⁽¹⁾

For Jaspers, therefore, the awareness of the unconditional embodied in the imperative of love means the awareness of "transcendence" (Transzendenz). "Love grows in bond with the Transcendent."⁽²⁾

In this view, Jaspers' conception of morality as culminating in love is primarily metaphysical rather than ethical. And his metaphysical concern is primarily bound up with praxis rather than ontological contemplation. Jaspers does not have recourse to man's empirical existence nor to authority. He is concerned with the significance of love not in a sentimental sense, nor in the eudaemonist sense, nor in the sense that it is based on authority. In the despair of man's empirical existence, and also in the awareness of the ruinous emptiness,

1. Cit. 56 ff.

3. Cit. 61.

invited by the loss of the power of authority, Jaspers now joins together with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and chooses to return to the self in order to reach a ground for the recovery of being. Through the conception of love, he is concerned with the Ground of Being. In love he sees the eternal cutting across time. In love he sees the unity of the eternal and the temporal.

Jaspers seems to have reached a transformation of Kierkegaard's Christian concept of love and Nietzsche's concept of the love of fate (amor fati). Love in Kierkegaard is the love which gives being to the self, whereas in Nietzsche it is the love which is required by the self in order to attain to being. For Jaspers love is what embodies the eternal and at the same time it is the way to the eternal.

"But the foundation of love, in which the unconditional is grounded, is identical with the will to authentic reality. I want what I love to be. And I cannot perceive what authentically is without loving."⁽¹⁾

As for metaphysical love, we have the classic example in Plato's dialogue the Symposium. In the dialogue, Socrates puts love into the relation between thought or thinking subject and Beauty itself or the eternal. He gives eternal meaning to love by comprehending love in a movement contexture from a love of the beauty of physical objects to the apprehension of the nature of Beauty itself. By pointing out the stage where one shares communion with the ultimate Beauty, Socrates suggests that the eternal dwells in man's unity of love and thought.

1. Cit. p. 62.

Jaspers' conception of love seems to follow this metaphysical conception of love.⁽¹⁾ Despite the formal similarity between the two, Jaspers' conception of love is characterized by his employment of a consciousness of historicity. Let us describe how Jaspers considers love as the fundamental reality in which the eternal or Being (Sein) is present in Time.

Jaspers criticizes the Cartesian ground of knowledge "I think" as emptying out knowledge into a "shell without content or order without movement".⁽²⁾ For Jaspers such a standpoint is to nullify everything. It is thought without love, he holds. It is not that out of which I live. It is love that is the ground. No one can either plan, intend nor move love; love is that through which I am given to myself, because love is that within which I choose myself.

"It grows in love that I choose myself and that I will through it. But intended love is not love at all."⁽³⁾

I soar out of love, therefore it is my "freedom".

We are concerned with beings. We handle a thing in subject-object dichotomy. In accordance with our own modes of being, we tend to take a being either as empirical, scientific, spiritual or existential. But each of these forms of knowledge is none other but an appearance, the totality of a being is beyond our subject-object dichotomy approach.

1. See Jaspers: Von der Wahrheit, s. 990, and also his The Great Philosophers, p. 154f.

2. Cit. p. 988.

3. Cit. p. 989.

Jaspers establishes the concept of "encompassing" (das Umgreifende) to imply such a transcending nature of being which is beyond subject-object dichotomy, because he holds that none of our objectifying approach is allowed to exhaust what is. Jaspers divides the "encompassing" into three: the encompassing that we are, the world and the Transcendent. Man and the world is differentiated because the world is partly subject to man's manipulation, and man and the world is not the encompassing in the ultimate sense. The Transcendent that is God is the Encompassing in the real sense because man can relate himself only through faith at the limit of all the possibilities of his approach within subject-object dichotomy.

Now to return to the question of love, Jaspers holds that "love is the word for the positive origin of the Encompassing of all encompassings" (Liebe ist das Wort fuer den positive Ursprung des Umgreifenden alles Umgreifenden). Jaspers defines man as Existenz in the sense that man is directly related to the Transcendent that is the Eternal God the Creator. Therefore love is regarded as identical with Existenz; that is to say, all modes such as empirical existence, general consciousness, spirit have to be considered as being within love which is man's Existenz. And this united nature of human love is inconceivable without reason which is "the positive, impregnated bond". Thus reason and love become united:

"Love is the positive, impregnated bond, as reason covers it uninterruptedly. Reason and love fall into one in which love is to work wholly (ganz) and limitlessly."⁽¹⁾

1. Cit. p. 989.

Therefore, Jaspers understands love in these different stages: love in empirical existence, love in general consciousness, love in spirit and love in Existenz. And love in Existenz indicates the most comprehensive love. Hence love of the object (appearance) has to be distinguished from that of being itself. But since love is personal, therefore the most comprehensive love in Existenz is related to love in God. Love is fulfilled between two poles: love as partaking the eternal and love as bound to the modes of our being relevant to subject-object dichotomy.⁽¹⁾ In other words, each stage of love gains its meaningfulness as a particular realization of one authentic love related to the Encompassing of all the encompassings. Though in fact each stage tends to claim its absolute-ness, such love isolated from the authentic unity is bound to lose its essence. And the recurrence to the authenticity of love, therefore, always presupposes reason which leads the modes of love to oneness of love.

"The becoming-one-ness (Einswerden) of love is its ground tendency as reason. Reason is boundless open-ness (Offenheit) to strive constantly for the inward-unity (Innesein) of what is in possibility of the becoming-one-ness from all with all. Hence reason is love, and as such it is in the becoming-one-ness of the modes of love as reason."⁽²⁾

By identifying love with reason in this way, Jaspers reaches a view of history. To sum up, love is the ground for all modes of man's being; and as Existenz facing the Transcendent, is identical with reason; therefore the unity of love and reason is the "temporal manifestation of eternal being: "The eternal is manifested in the time of the world."⁽³⁾

1. Cit. s. 1002.

2. Cit. s. 1004.

3. Jaspers: Way to Wisdom, p. 84.

History gains its reality from the timeless in time. History must be understood as praxis of love prior to all possible forms of philosophy of history. Therefore all historical words of the Transcendent must not be identified with Being in itself. Jaspers concentrates his thought in the following two theses that he calls "ground-experience":

"First the experience of God's absolute transcendence over the world: the hidden God recedes farther and farther in to the distance if I attempt to seize and apprehend Him universally and forever; He is incalculably near through the absolutely historical form of His speech in a situation which is always unique.

"Second, the existence of God's speech in the world: the world is not in itself, but in it God speaks, always with many meanings, and this speech can only become clear historically in the existential moment and cannot be generalized."⁽¹⁾

Jaspers has led us to the point wherein lies the meaningfulness of reason. For Jaspers, reason should not be regarded as if it were apart from man's historicity. Jaspers chooses to obey the imperative of love as God's historical word to modern times. But man's historicity rests no longer upon a historicist view of history, but upon the encounter of Existenz with God. Therefore reason is fundamentally man's response to God's challenge offering the fulfilment of love. Reason is the praxis of love.

II. Reason as a way to Being

In the preceding section, we discussed the fundamental nature of Jaspers' conception of reason as springing from his awareness of the

1. Cit. p. 82.

Ground of Being. And therein we saw the determining role played by his consciousness of historicity of man. Thus we have arrived at the point where reason is grounded upon faith, and identifies itself as a praxis of love which is the historical word of the eternal. In the following, let us see more definitely the structure of such a praxis. We shall restrict ourselves to describe how this praxis is considered as "transcending" and "communication". The former is concerned with the reason's movement towards Being, and the latter is concerned with the reason's movement towards the succession and co-existence of man's concerns for Being. The former is vertical whereas the latter is horizontal. We divide this way for convenience's sake, although authentically they are one.

(a) Transcending

As we have seen, man's living relation to the eternal is grounded upon reason as praxis. And reason is also involved in man's choice of love as the voice of the Transcendent. Jaspers names this relationship "Existenz". Though man's mode of being splits inevitably into empirical existence, general consciousness or spirit (Geist), Existenz is "a fundamental origin and the condition of selfhood without which all the vastness of being becomes a desert."⁽¹⁾ It is "the axis about which everything in the world turns if it is to have genuine meaning for us."⁽²⁾

However, this state of Existenz must not be regarded as stable.

1. Jaspers: Reason and Existenz, p. 61.

2. Ibid.

There is no Existenz apart from empirical existence. Man cannot remain wholly in Existenz apart from his temporality. Seen from this bondage of temporality, Existenz is the moment at which a man becomes himself. Jaspers points out reason's fundamental root which is structuralized into the basic tensions of Existenz. That is to say, in its fundamental relation to the Transcendent, Existenz consists in polarity. For example, "defiance and devotion" (Trotz und Hingabe), "descent and ascent" (Abfall und Aufstieg) or "law of day and passion towards night" (das Gesetz des Tages und die Leidenschaft zur Nacht), or "riches of the many and the one" (der Reichtum des Vielen und das Eine).⁽¹⁾

Moreover, man's attitude to the transcendent is not simple. The name such as Being, Reality, Deity, or God already shows the variety of this attitude. We name or call the Transcendent, "Being": this means that we think it as the Encompassing, and then we regard it as a theme for "abstract transcending thought".⁽²⁾ When we live with it, it is called authentic "Reality".⁽³⁾ When this Reality speaks to us something demanding, ruling and surrounding, we call it "Deity".⁽⁴⁾ And when we regard it as a person, it is called "God".⁽⁵⁾ In none of these cases, the Transcendent becomes an object. Man is restricted to faith-relation. Thus Existenz is fundamentally an unstable way of being.

1. See Jaspers: Philosophie Vol. III, s. 68ff.

2. Jaspers: Von der Wahrheit, s. 111.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

Further, Existenz is constantly related to other modes of being human. A man is a relation to the other. He regards the world and the Transcendent as object to him. No matter, whether as empirical existence or the understanding, or Geist, he is not allowed to reach the totality of the world. The horizontal movement of each level of these ways is bound to "shipwreck". The other as the world, which becomes the object of our scientific approach, is only an appearance of what itself is for it "always recedes and manifests itself indirectly".⁽¹⁾ The other as Being shows itself to "no investigative experience, not even indirectly".⁽²⁾ And yet it is Existenz that through which Being speaks.⁽³⁾

In the midst of such a splintering of being, Existenz as "potential Existenz" is committed to clarifying all the modes of being so that it may remain open to the Transcendent. It is reason that carries out this task. Each mode of being must be so clarified that its particularity and relationship to other modes may be realized in the authentic meaning-context of the Transcendent-relationship. Reason is Existenz's praxis. It does not reach as that understanding which is merely objective thinking, the transformation of the opaque into the transparent. Nor does it mean spirit (Geist) which is the way to totalities, the life of the Idea. Reason goes beyond all these limits to stand before the absolutely counter-rational:

"But if reason means the pre-eminence of thought
in all modes of the encompassing, then more is included

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1. Jaspers: Reason and Existenz, p. 60.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Jaspers: Von der Wahrheit, s. 107.

than mere thinking. It is then what goes beyond all limits, the omnipresent demand of thought, that not only grasps what is universally valid and is an ens rationis in the sense of being a law or principle of order of some process, but also brings to light the Other, stands before the absolutely counter-rational, touching it and bringing it, too, into being. Reason, through the pre-eminence of thought, can bring all the modes of the encompassing to light by continually transcending limits, without itself being an encompassing like them."⁽¹⁾

(b) Communication

This transcending movement of reason, however, cannot be real if it foregoes the task of communication. Existenz is bound to "historicity". The Transcendent is the Encompassing of all the encompassings. We hear the voice of God only within our own particular moment of history.

As we have seen, reason is love. And it is therefore fundamentally concerned with authenticity of other "Existenzen". Man is not allowed to become authentic without his fellow's also becoming authentic. Hence reason is open to the word of the Transcendent which comes to these other "Existenzen", and on the other hand, it is also committed to the task of awakening other potential Existenzen.

Jaspers, because of this, holds that there is no truth that is identical with the Transcendent. The particular revelations of various religions and the metaphysical structures of philosophy are not distinguished from each other, because he regards their truth as timeless in time. In comparison with the Transcendent, he characterizes these truths

1. Jaspers: Reason and Existenz, p. 65.

as "symbols" or "ciphers". The transcending reason is concerned with these symbols, taking them as objects for interpretation in terms of Existenz's awareness of Being.

In order to awaken one's fellow's potential Existenz and to encourage him to become himself, reason restricts itself to think in universal forms. None of those modes which we are can be isolated nor absolutized:

"The communication of Existenz is accomplished through membership in the spirit, through the universality of consciousness as such, through proving itself in empirical existence, but also by breaking through these, passing beyond them in the loving struggle of those who will to become themselves."⁽¹⁾

But this will to communicate does not reach fulfilment, because it is bound within the three modes and in the last resort it finds itself limited through its own, as well as others' "historicity". Due to this historicity, truth appears in multiplicity, and therefore, the will to communicate is bound to be wrecked.

Nevertheless, at the end of this exercise of communication, the resoluteness of the latter brings forth the deepest openness to the Transcendent. Reason and Existenz are in a polaric unity. Reason without Existenz is hollow. Reason is in the acts of potential Existenz. As the praxis of potential Existenz it is a way to authentic being.

"Reason without Existenz even in the richest possible field finally passes into an indifferent thinking, a merely intellectual movement of consciousness as

1. Jaspers: Way to Wisdom, p. 91.

such, or into a dialectic of spirit. And as it slips away into intellectual universality without the binding root of its historicity, it ceases to be reason.

"Irrational Existenz which rests upon feeling, experiencing, unquestioned impulse, instinct, or whim, ends up as blind violence, and therewith falls under the empirical laws which govern these actual forces. Without historicity, lost in the mere particularities of contingent empirical existence in a self-assertion unrelated to the Transcendent, it ceases to be Existenz."⁽¹⁾

1. Cit. p. 68.

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